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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
PATRICIA BARBER, ) 
Plaintiff/Appellant/ ) 
vs. ) Case No. 960783-CA 
SAM JOHN BARBER, JR., ) Civil No. 924901656DA 
Defendant/Respondent. ) Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
PATRICIA BARBER 
JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated, § 78-2a-3(2)(h). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Sam Barber's income. Did the trial court correctly determine 
Sam Barber's gross income by not imputing to his personal income 
charitable contributions made to his church and favorite charities by 
his businesses? Standard of Review: While the trial court's findings 
of fact in divorce appeals are reviewed under the "clearly erroneous 
standard" its conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness and are 
accorded no special deference on appeal. Smith vs. Smith, 793 P.2d 
407, 409 (Utah App. 1990). This issue was preserved in the trial 
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court as reflected by Finding of Fact 9. 
II. Child support and alimony. Did the trial court award sufficient 
child support and alimony to Patricia Barber after determining Sam 
Barber's personal income should exclude charitable contributions made 
to his church and other charities by his business? Should Patricia 
Barber's alimony award automatically terminate and not exceed the 
length of the parties' marriage? 
Standard of Review: A trial court's decision regarding alimony 
and child support will not be disturbed absent manifest injustice or 
inequity that indicates a clear abuse of discretion. Jensen vs. 
Bowcutt. 892 P.2d 1053, 1055 (Utah App. 1995). Howell vs. Howell, 806 
P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah App. 1991). While the trial court's findings of 
fact in divorce appeals are reviewed under the "clearly erroneous 
standard", its conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness and 
given no special deference on appeal. Bingham vs. Bingham, 872 P.2d 
1065, 1067 (Utah App. 1994). This issue was preserved in the trial 
court as reflected by Findings of Fact 9, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 
53, and 54, and Patricia Barber's written closing arguments. 
III. Business Valuation. Did the trial court err in valuing Sam 
Barber's collective ownership interests in the various Barber Brothers 
companies by not utilizing the capitalization of excess earnings 
method? Did the trial court err by receiving into evidence Sam 
Barber's personal CPA's business valuation? Did the trial court err 
in deducting marketability and minority interest discounts in valuing 
the businesses? Did the trial court make a clerical error in valuing 
2 
the businesses? 
Standard Review: Utah appellate courts review the valuation of 
stock and business property under the "clearly erroneous" standard. 
Under this standard of review, findings of fact will be set aside only 
if they are against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the 
appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that 
a mistake has been made. Argyle vs. Argyle, 688 P.2d 468, 470 (Utah 
1984); and Weston vs. Weston, 773 P.2d 408, 410 (Utah App. 1989). The 
issue was preserved in the trial court as reflected by Findings of 
Fact 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, and 42, and Patricia Barber's written 
closing arguments. 
Valuation and attorney fees. 
IV. Did the trial court err in failing to require Sam Barber to 
contribute toward payment of Patricia Barber's valuation fees and 
should Sam Barber pay her attorney fees incurred on appeal? 
Standard of Review: A trial court's decision regarding attorney 
fees and costs will not be disturbed absence on abuse of discretion. 
Peterson vs. Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305, 1310 (Utah App. 1991). In the 
event Patricia Barber prevails an appeal the issue of attorney fees 
and costs can be remanded to the trial court for determination of 
whether she is entitled to attorney fees on appeal and her costs. 
Schaumberg vs. Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 604 (Utah App. 1994) . This 
issue was preserved in the trial court as evidenced by Patricia 
Barber's written closing arguments. 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
(1) Section 78-45-7.5(4)(a), Utah Code Annotated, is believed to 
be determinative in computing Sam Barber's gross income for purposes 
of calculating appropriate child support. Said statute states: 
Gross income from self employment or 
operation of a business shall be 
calculated by subtracting necessary 
expenses required for self employment 
or business operations from gross receipts. 
The income and expenses from self-employment 
or operation of a business shall be 
reviewed to determine an appropriate level 
of gross income available to the parent to 
satisfy a child support award. Only those 
expenses necessary to allow the business to 
operate a reasonable level may be deducted 
from gross receipts. 
(2) Section 30-3-5(7)(h), Utah Code Annotated, states as follows: 
Alimony may not be ordered for a duration 
longer than the number of years that the 
marriage existed unless, at any time prior 
to termination of alimony, the court finds 
extinuating circumstances that justify 
the payment of alimony for a longer period 
of time. 
(3) Section 7 of the Constitution of Utah states as follows: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property without due process of law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the District Court of 
Weber County, State of Utah, District Court Judge, Michael D. Lyon, 
presiding, of a divorce case deciding issues of property division, 
alimony, and child support. At trial, Patricia Barber, sought a 
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fifty (50%) percent property award of Sam Barber's ownership interest 
in the Barber Brothers automobile dealerships and companies, an award 
of alimony based upon the disparity in the parties' income and length 
of marriage, and appropriate child support based upon Sam Barber's 
monthly gross income. 
Sam Barber stipulated Patricia Barber may be awarded custody of 
their child, Adrian Barber, awarded the family residence, and awarded 
the furnishings and personal property within her possession. The 
issues presented at trial were: (1) valuation of Sam Barber's interest 
in the various Barber Brothers automobile dealerships and companies, 
an award of alimony and child support to Patricia Barber after 
determining Sam Barber's income. 
The primary issue at trial was to determine as of December 31, 
1995, the fair market value of certain ownership interests held by Sam 
Barber in several automobile dealerships and related companies. 
Several business evaluators rendered their opinion as to the value of 
Sam Barber's interests in the following five business entities: 
Sam Barber's ownership interests 
Barber Bros. Pontiac-Oldsmobile, Inc. 51.50% percent interest 
Barber Bros. Imports, Inc. 44.00% percent interest 
Barber Bros. Motor Company, Inc. 39.03% percent interest 
Barber Bros. Automotive Services, Inc. 25.00% percent interest 
Barber Bros. Limited Partnership 25.00% percent interest 
The trial court found it reasonable and appropriate to take a 
minority interest discount of 30% and a marketability discount of 20% 
in valuing Sam Barber's business interests. The trial court found the 
collective value of Sam Barber's business interests in Barber Brothers 
to be $728,318. Accordingly, the trial court found Patricia Barber 
was entitled to one-half of that amount, $364,159. Sam Barber was 
ordered to pay Patricia Barber a down payment of $64,159 cash. After 
offseting Sam Barber's equity in the marital residence, the sum of 
$291,000 was ordered to be paid in monthly installments of $2,117.16 
through May, 1999, and thereafter in monthly installments of $2,413.46 
until February, 2016. 
The trial court averaged all four (4) of the business evaluator's 
valuations in determining Sam Barber's collective business interests 
except Kevin Yeanoplos' method of capitalization of excess earnings. 
The trial court stated the method as applied to this case was not 
creditable and chose to completely disregard it. 
The Court found Sam Barber was employed by Barber Brothers 
Pontiac-Oldsmobile, as President of the corporation and earned a base 
salary of $78,000.00 per year, plus he received an average annual 
bonus of $8,000.00. In addition, Sam Barber received approximately 
$6,600.00 annually in personal automobile use for himself and his 
oldest daughter, Angelia Barber, plus $600.00 per year personal use of 
business credit cards, $500.00 per year for personal use of the Barber 
Brothers cabin in Island Park, Idaho, $1,100 per year health club 
membership dues, and $1,500 per year for vacation expenses, for a 
total annual income of $96,300.00. 
The trial court did not include in Sam Barber's personal income 
charitable contributions paid by the Barber Brothers companies to Sam 
Barber's church and other charities. The Court reasoned it would be 
inequitable and a "double charge" to add the charitable contributions 
both to the value of the businesses for valuation purposes and to Sam 
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Barber's personal income for purposes of determining alimony and child 
support. 
The trial court awarded Patricia Barber custody of the parties' 
minor child, Adrian Barber, and ordered child support of $687.00 per 
month. Sam Barber was ordered to pay alimony to Patricia Barber of 
$300.00 per month through May, 1997, and $500.00 per month thereafter 
provided alimony not last longer than the parties' marriage of 
eighteen (18) years, five (5) months. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Sam and Patricia Barber were initially married on September 10, 
1971, they later divorced, and the parties remarried on September 10, 
1977 (Findings of Fact #1). Two children were born of issue of the 
marriage, Angelia Barber, born December 25, 1977, and Adrian Barber, 
born May 29, 1981 (R at 22, 23). 
Patricia Barber was in relatively good health except for a 
persistent back problem (R at 24). At the time of trial, she was 
employed at Dillards earning $8.00 per hour averaging 35 hours per 
week; i.e. $1,213.00 per month gross income (R at 25). She graduated 
from high school and attended nine months of college (R at 26). 
Patricia Barber was not employed during the marriage except for a 
short time with Community Action and as a waitress (R at 27). She 
was 45 years of age at the time of trial (R at 22). 
Sam Barber is just a few hours short of obtaining a bachelor's 
degree, having attended the University of Utah and Weber State 
University (R at 85). He started working in the automotive business 
with Zion's Motor when he was 21 years old (R at 86). He was general 
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sales manager of Freed's when he left in 1981 (R at 87). He and his 
brothers established Barber Brothers Motor Company in 1984, a 
Chrysler-Plymouth dealership in Spanish Fork, Utah after leaving 
Freeds (R at 95). Later he purchased a small dealership in Morgan, 
Utah known as High Country Chevrolet (R at 88). In 1988, Sam Barber 
sold the assets of High Country Chevrolet and started Barber Brothers 
Pontiac-Olds in Woods Cross, Utah (R at 90-94). 
Sam Barber reported wages of $78,817.00 in 1994 and $87,884.00 in 
1995 as per W-2's issued to him (R at 97, Exhibit #4). His salary is 
paid from the Pontiac-Olds dealership, Woods Cross, Utah, in which he 
owns more than 50% of the stock (R at 95). Sam Barber is provided 
certain perks from his companies including an automobile for himself, 
monthly gasoline allowance, automobile for his wife and daughter, 
clothing allowance, auto insurance, unlimited auto repair, $100.00 a 
month for entertainment, occasional Jazz tickets, out of state 
vacations, a company cabin at Island Park, Idaho, and athletic club 
dues (R at 100-115). 
Sam and Patricia Barber's joint 1993 income tax return indicated 
a total income of $152,952 (R at 115, 116, Exhibit 5). The Pontiac-
Oldsmobile dealership in Woods Cross, Utah, is a corporation that 
elected to be taxed as a subchapter "S" corporation ( R at 116). Fifty 
One (51%) percent of the corporation income flows through to Sam 
Barber (R at 116). Barber Brothers elected to have several of their 
businesses taxed as a Subchapter "S" corporations to avoid" double 
taxation" (R at 442). 
In 1994, Sam Barber reported a total personal income of $350,607 
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as per his Federal tax return (R at 117, Exhibit #6). His W-2 wages 
were reported at $78,817.00 which included salary and bonus (R at 
117) . 
The trial court found for most of the marriage the entire 
family's standard of living was somewhere around $3,300.00 per month 
in disposable income (Findings of Fact #56). The trial court found 
Patricia Barber's reasonable monthly living expenses for herself and 
son Adrian were $3,343.00 per month (Findings of Fact #51). Patricia 
Barber testified she needed to purchase a car since her automobile had 
historically been provided by Barber Brothers (R at 47). She also 
needed to obtain her own health insurance at a cost of $215.00 per 
month (R at 48). The parties during their marriage also had a 
housekeeper (R at 46). 
Patricia Barber asked the court to calculate child support based 
upon Sam Barber earning $150,000.00 per annum (R at 52, Exhibit #3) 
and award alimony also based on that salary (R at 44). 
Pursuant to a temporary order issued in 1992, Sam Barber was 
ordered to pay $1,504.00 per month child support for Adrian and 
Angelia Barber and $1,493.00 for the house payment, utilities, and 
cash to Patricia Barber (R at 80, 81) . 
In 1994, Sam Barber during the parties' separation, purchased a 
building lot for $3 8,000.00 while paying Patricia Barber temporary 
monthly alimony and child support of $2,997.00 (R at 82, 83). 
Payments on his building lot were $400.00 per month. His total 
housing payments were $1,150.00 per month, $750.00 for his condominium 
and $400.00 for his lot (R at 84). 
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In 1994 Fred Barber, a brother reported W-2 wages of $137,264.00, 
a difference of $60,000.00 more than Sam Barber (R at 118). Fred 
Barber operates Barber Bros Motor Company in Spanish Fork, Utah, (R at 
119). That dealership is a "C" Corporation for tax purposes. (R at 
119). In 1994, $35,000.00 of charitable contributions were "passed out 
to Fred Barber" (R at 119) . 
Daniel P. Mahfood, general sales manager at Sam Barber's Pontiac-
Olds dealership, earned W-2 wages of $102,573.00 in 1994 (R at 121). 
That same year Sam Barber reported W-2 wages of $78,817 from the same 
Pontiac-Olds dealership (R at 122). If Sam Barber's Pontiac-Olds 
dealership, was taxed as a "C" Corporation, in 19 94 he would have to 
claim additional income of $39,757.00 spent for charitable 
contributions (R at 123, 124). Sam Barber and his brothers set aside 
a percentage of the Barber Brothers companies profits for charitable 
contribution (R at 162). The charitable contributions are based on 
ten (10%) percent of net profit (R at 162). 
In 1995, Sam Barber's Pontiac-Olds dealership paid $18,000.00 
toward his attorney and business valuation costs incurred in these 
proceedings (R at 161). The dealership carries this transaction on 
its books as an accounts receivable from Sam Barber (R at 161). Sam 
Barber testified I can pay them, I'll be required to pay them. It 
depends on what happens at this trial (R at 191). 
Sam Barber testified the Barber Brothers auto dealerships' new 
car advertising costs were higher than the industry standard (R at 
1098). The combined new and used car advertising costs were on 
average 10% higher than the industry standard (R at 10 98) . 
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Sam Barber testified he believed a significant portion of Barber 
Brothers automobile sales were derived as a result of charitable 
contributions (R at 1106). Sam Barber testified he sold a lot of 
cars to members of his church (R at 1109). Sam Barber also testified 
he derived sales of automobiles from other charities to which he 
contributed (R at 1107). 
In 1994, Sam Barber's Pontiac-Olds dealership paid charitable 
contributions of $66,646.00 (Defendant's Exhibit 62). The remaining 
Barber Brothers auto dealerships and businesses paid charitable 
contributions in addition to that sum. Of the total charitable 
contributions made in 1994 by all the combined dealerships and 
businesses, Sam Barber's share was $39,757.00. (Exhibit 6, Schedule 
A, Itemized Deductions of Sam Barber's personal income tax return for 
1994). Sam Barber reduced his taxable income by $39,757.00 for 
charitable contributions as per Schedule A of his 1994 personal income 
tax return. (Exhibit 6). 
In Exhibit 79, Sam Barber listed his average monthly living 
expenses (R at 1221). He did not list any charitable contributions on 
his monthly living expenses ( R at 1221). Sam Barber stated there was 
a good reason for that since he didn't pay them (R at 1221). Sam 
Barber testified the business paid the charitable contributions to his 
church and other charities ( R at 1221). Sam Barber testified his 
businesses paid charitable contributions in addition to the companies' 
above average promotion and advertising expense ( R at 1221). When 
asked if paying charitable contributions was an election or choice he 
had made, Sam Barber responded that's a choice my brothers and I have 
-11-
made because we feel we are obligated to do that because of our 
spiritual convictions (R at 1222). When asked why he did not add the 
charitable contributions to truly reflect his income, he responded the 
companies made the contributions, not him ( R at 1222). 
Patricia Barber called Kevin R. Yeanoplos, a CPA, as one of her 
business evaluators (R at 233). He specializes in business 
valuations (R at 236). Approximately fifty to sixty percent of his 
practice involved business valuations (R at 239). In addition to 
being a CPA, Mr. Yeanoplos is also a CVA, Certified Valuation Analyist 
(R at 239). 
Mr. Yeanopolos described the various Barber Brothers companies as 
being a closely held business that qualifies as a closely held 
corporation for valuation purposes (R at 249). In valuing a closely 
held business or corporation, a business valuator has to follow the 
guidelines set forth in IRS Revenue Ruling 59-60 (R at 249.) The 
factors listed in Revenue Ruling 59-60, for the valuation of security 
interests and closely held businesses, are set forth on page 1 and 
page 2 of Exhibit 12, Kevin Yeanoplos's business valuation report. 
Mr. Yeanoplos was furnished certain financial records prepared in 
the ordinary course of business of Barber Brothers (R at 252). He 
was provided with the auto dealerships' "dealer statements" and tax 
returns (R at 253). Mr. Yeanoplos did not rely on the tax returns 
although he reviewed them (R at 253). Mr. Yeanoplos testifed the tax 
returns do not reflect economic reality of the businesses as tax 
returns are tax motivated and his intent was to value the economic 
reality of the businesses (253-254) . 
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Mr. Yeanoplos did not use a Rule of Thumb method in his valuation 
of the Barber Brothers companies (R at 43). He testified a Rule of 
Thumb method simply gives a ball park estimate (R at 43). Exhibit 17 
and 18 indicates a Rule of Thumb method should not be used by itself 
and should not be given substantial weight unless supported by other 
valuation methods. Mr. Yeanoplos testified that a Rule of Thumb 
method is derived from actual market sales transactions (R at 404) In 
otherwords, it would be an actual sale of a business (R at 404). 
Thus, marketability and minority interest discounts would be 
inappropriate as the value stated would be the final negotiated sale 
price (R at 404) 
Mr. Yeanoplos in his business valuation used two methods: (1) 
the capitalization of earnings method which is an income base method 
where future earnings and operations are not expected to significantly 
change from current normalized operations or where future returns are 
expected to grow at a somewhat predictable rate (Page 24 of Exhibit 
12) . 
The second methodology used was the capitalization of excess 
earnings method, sometimes referred to as the "treasury method" (Page 
24 of Exhibit 12). The capitalization of excess earnings method is an 
income and asset based approach that capitalizes earnings of the 
business that are in excess of a reasonable rate of return on the net 
assets of the business. Any rate of return above the reasonable rate 
on tangible assets is considered to arise from intangible assets; 
i.e., goodwill. The reasonable rate of return on net tangible assets 
is determined by using the prevailing industry rate of return. (Page 
-13-
24 of Exhibit 12). 
Mr. Yeanoplos, in adjusting the income stream of the Barber 
Brothers businesses, removed charitable contributions from operating 
expenses in his valuation. This adjustment is made as Adjustment No. 
12 found on Page 17 of Exhibit 12. Adjustments made for charitable 
contributions expenses for the last five years totaled $261,174.00. 
David Dorton, a financial analyst and valuation consultant also 
testified on behalf of Patricia Barber as to the value of the various 
Barber Brothers businesses (R at 651, 652). Mr. Dorton has a 
bachelor's degree in finance and a MBA degree from the University of 
Utah (R at 652). He is a senior member of the American Society of 
Appraisers in business valuation and a Chartered Financial Analyst 
(R at 652). Mr. Dorton has a been a business valuator for the last 
fifteen years (R at 652). He has performed over a 1,000 business 
valuations, two of which have been for automobile dealerships (R at 
656) . 
Mr. Dorton reported that Barber Brothers company sales has grown 
very rapidly from 1993-1995, at a compound rate of 11.1%. The auto 
dealerships had a very impressive sales growth (R at 665-666) . 
Mr. Dorton indicated he used five basic methods of valuing the 
businesses: (1) book value, (2) income value, (3) the market value, 
(4) the formula value, and (5) transaction value (R at 659). Mr. 
Dorton gave more weight to certain methods depending upon the 
particular company in question (R at 659) . 
Mr. Dorton in valuing the true net income of the company added 
back in charitable contributions expenses to the reported net income 
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(R at 689). Mr. Dorton described charitable contributions as a 
discretionary expense. He stated discretionary expenditures are 
typically added back because they are not necessary (R at 689-690). 
David Dorton's opinion as to the value of Barber Brothers Motor 
Company is found on page 16 of Exhibit 28. He valued Barber Brothers 
Motor Company as of December 31, 1995 at $1,200,000.00. Sam Barber's 
ownership interest in that company was $468,400.00 as he owned 39.3% 
shares of stock. 
Mr. Dorton's valuation of Barber Brothers Pontiac Oldsmobile 
dealership is found on page 21 of Exhibit 28. He valued the Pontiac-
Olds Dealership at $1,040,000.00. Sam Barber owns 51.5% of that 
company therefore his ownership interest is $545,600.00. 
David Dorton valued Barber Brothers Mitibushi dealership on page 
27 of his valuation report, Exhibit 28. In his opinion, the value of 
that dealership as of December 31, 1995 was $190,000.00. Sam Barber 
owns 44% of that company therefore his interest is $83,600.00. 
David Dorton valued the Warranty Company, formerly known as 
Barber Brothers Automotive Services at $620,000.00. His valuation is 
found on page 29 of Exhibit 28. Sam Barber owns 25% of that company 
therefore his interest is $155,000.00. 
Mr. Dorton valued the Barber Brothers' Family Partnership by 
deducting total liabilities from total assets to determine a net 
equity. He valued the net assets of the partnership at $1,296,800.00, 
and after deducting total liabilities of $863,600.00 he valued the 
partnership equity at $435,000.00. Sam Barber owns 25% of the 
partnership equity, that is $108,700.00. Mr. Dorton valued Sam 
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Barber's collective interest in all the various Barber companies at 
$1,351,300.00. (Exhibit 28 at page 31). 
David Dorton stated his valuation methods did take into account 
marketability discounts (R at 704). The marketability discount is 
implicitly built in each of his valuation methods (R at 704). Mr. 
Dorton testified he did not consider it appropriate to take a minority 
interest discount in valuing the five Barber Brothers business 
entities (R at 706). Inasmuch as Sam Barber owns over 50% in the 
Pontiac Oldsmobile dealership, a minority interest discount would not 
be applicable in that case (R at 707). Mr. Dorton stated the 
hypothetical buyers of Sam Barber's business interest would be his 
brothers. He reasoned a brother would likely pay premium price to 
obtain Sam Barber's interest and therefore control the various 
companies (R at 707). In the event Sam Barber's business interests 
were not sold, a minority interest discount would not be appropriate 
(R at 707) . 
David Dorton testified that valuing the Barber Brothers companies 
by one single method such as a Rule of Thumb, could not be done 
properly (R at 626). He reasoned that not only do you have to look 
at a level of earnings for each company but also as to growth trends, 
risk, financial characteristics, geographical characteristics and none 
of those are properly included in a one single formula (R at 726). 
Debra Kelley, a CPA, whose practice emphasizes taxation, was 
called as a witness on behalf of Patricia Barber. Ms. Kelley 
graduated from Weber State University with a Bachelor's Degree in 
accounting and a Master's Degree in Taxation from American University 
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in Washington, D.C. (R at 784, 785). She has been practicing as a CPA 
since 1981 (R at 785). 
In 1986, she worked for a national CPA firm in Washington, D.C. 
and became involved with the auto industry (R at 786). She was 
involved with three large auto dealerships in Washington, D.C, all of 
which were significantly larger than Barber Brothers (R at 787). She 
remained in the Washington, D.C. area from 1986 through 1989 (R at 
787). She worked in Oregon for a CPA firm from 1989 to 1992 (R at 
787) . 
In December, 1992, she became employed at Dan James & Associates, 
a CPA firm in Ogden, Utah, as Director of Taxation (R at 788). That 
CPA firm specializes in auto dealerships (R at 788). A significant 
amount of her continuing professional education since 1992 has been in 
the auto industry (R at 790) . She is familar with "dealer statements" 
prepared by auto dealers for their manufacturers (R at 788). 
Ms. Kelley testified that if Sam Barber's charitable 
contributions were added to his salary, his annual compensation would 
be over $150,000.00 (R at 800, 815, and 816). 
Ms. Kelley testified Exhibit 20 is the annual lease value table 
utilized by Internal Revenue Service for valuing personal use of a 
company car. She computed the personal use of the automobiles used by 
Sam Barber's family members by assigning 50% personal for Sam Barber, 
(R at 801), and for the spouse and children of Sam Barber, she 
assigned 100% personal use (R at 802-803). 
Ms. Kelley testified that setting up the warranty reserve expense 
account for Barber Brothers Automotive Services, Inc. was appropriate. 
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It is reasonable to recognize that one is going to incur some 
liability at some point and therefore one should make a reasonable 
estimate for reserve for warranty claims (R at 831-832) . However, 
for tax purposes, the warranty reserve expense is not immediately 
deductible (R at 832). Ms. Kelley testified there is a tax benefit 
due Sam Barber because warranty reserves are being carried on the 
company books (R at 832). She stated that in the business valuations 
that considered taxes, the evaluator did not take into account this 
tax benefit (R at 832). Mark Papanikolas agreed with her analysis 
(R at 954) . 
Defendant, Sam Barber, called as a business evaluator, the 
company CPA, Mark Papanikolas (R at 875, 876). Mark Papanikolas 
started his own CPA firm in 1985, Papanikolas, Tucker & Company (R at 
879). Mr. Papanikolas is the accountant for all the Barber Brothers 
dealerships (R at 880). He was asked by Sam Barber to prepare a 
valuation for these businesses (R at 880) . 
Mr. Papanikolas testified he loaned money to Barber Brothers in 
the sum of $25,000.00 (R at 881). Additionally his sister loaned 
$200,000.00 to Barber Brothers (R at 881). Mark Papanikolas' 
business valuation is set forth in Exhibit 16. 
Mark Papanikolas testified in determining the goodwill of the 
Barber Brothers companies, he took five (5) years of earnings, made 
appropriate adjustments and applied a factor to the five (5) year 
average in order to arrive at a goodwill figure (R at 886). 
Mr. Papanikolas in reaching his valuation of the various Barber 
Brothers Companies took a marketability discount (R at 902). A 
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marketability discount reflects a discount applied because there is no 
ready market (R at 902) . 
Mark Papanikolas also took a minority discount in valuing the 
various businesses (R at 902). Mr. Papanikolas testified a minority 
discount is taken when you have a shareholder who owns less than fifty 
(50%) interest in the business (R at 902). Mr. Papanikolas testified 
there was a split of authority as to whether or not discounts would 
generally be taken as applied to a minority interest in a family owned 
company (R at 905). 
Mark Papanikolas stated he based his business evaluation on what 
a willing buyer and willing seller would agree to, neither acting 
under any compulsion to buy or sell (R at 910). He stated in his 
valuation of the businesses, that he did not consider the tax impact 
on the sale of the business entities in the valuation itself (R at 
910). Mr. Papanikolas originally valued Sam Barber's collective 
interest in the various business entities of Barber Brothers at 
$473,700.00 (R at 917). However, Mr. Papanikolas indicated he had 
changed his mind in respect to his valuation and believed that a 
portion of the depreciation of fixed assets should be added back in 
order to arrive at a higher number for the value of fixed assets (R 
at 917, 918). It raised Sam Barber's value by $69,000.00 (R at 918). 
Mark Papanikolas testified there was one other adjustment, raised 
by Debra Kelley, that he would make to his business valuation. That 
adjustment was on Barber Brothers Automotive Services reserve for 
future warranty claims (R at 954). The Internal Revenue Service 
does not allow reserves established for claims to be deducted in the 
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year established, permitting a deduction only when actually paid. 
Barber Brothers had to "front load", or front end the income tax. (R 
at 954). In the future when claims were made, there will be a tax 
benefit derived from that (R at 954). Mr. Papanikolas calculated the 
impact on Sam Barber's valuation to be an additional $20,000.00 (R at 
954). Mark Papanikolas final value of Sam Barber's interest was 
approximately $560,000.00 (R at 954, 955). 
Mark Papanikolas in his valuation, in order to come up with an 
average earnings of five years for the businesses, added back to 
business income charitable contribution expenses of more than 5% of 
income (R at 928). Thus, he allowed charitable contributions as a 
business expense at 5% of the business income (R at 929). 
Mr. Papanikolas testified as to his $25,000.00 loan to Barber 
Brothers, he was receiving interest only payments and no principal 
payments had been made to date although the loan was taken out three 
years ago (R at 966). Mr. Papanikolas arranged his sister's loan 
with Barber Brothers (R at 966). Mark Papanikolas receives 
$2,000.00 per month payment on behalf of his sister from Barber 
Brothers (R at 968). He deposits the payment in his sister's bank 
account (R at 968). Also, as Barber Brothers accountant, he bills an 
average of $3,500.00 a month for his services (R at 969). 
The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants Code of 
Professional Conduct, states an accountant should not value a business 
and his objectivity may be questioned if he maintains a financial 
interest in the business he is valuing (R at 970, 971, Exhibit 47). 
Patricia Barber objected to Mark Papanikolas' valuation as he had "a 
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financial interest" in Barber Brothers. (See written Closing Argument 
of Patricia Barber). 
Mark Papanikolas stated "he didn't see it that way" when asked if 
Sam Barber was actually being compensated at $150,000.00 per year (R 
at 976). Mr. Papanikolas conceded Sam Barber had some discretion over 
the charitable contributions made by the Barber Brothers businesses 
since it was a business philosophy (R at 976). Mark Papanikolas 
conceded some of the charitable contributions go to the church Sam 
Barber attends as well as to a private school with whom he is 
associated (R at 976). When asked if Sam Barber's annual 
compensation was $150,000.00 a year considering charitable 
contributions, Mark Papanikolas responded he did not consider the 
charitable contributions as Sam Barber's personal expense. He 
testified the Barber Brothers have a philosophy charitable 
contributions are a company expense. (R at 981). 
The trial court requested Mark Papanikolas to determine Sam 
Barber's salary if one included all the perks and charitable 
contributions (R at 1037). Mr. Papanikolas calculations of Sam 
Barber's salary are set forth in Exhibit 51 (R at 1038). Exhibit 51 
indicates an annual total salary for Sam Barber of $123,600.00 which 
includes average charitable contributions over the last five (5) 
years. (See Exhibit 51). 
Mark Papanikolas testified he used a base salary of $78,000.00, 
added average bonuses of $8,000.00 per year, added personal automobile 
use of $2,800.00, $2,600.00 for the automobile provided to Angelia 
Barber, $600.00 for gas and repairs for Sam Barber, $600.00 for 
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repairs to Angelia Barber, personal use of credit cards of $600.00, 
personal use of the cabin at Island Park of $500.00, health club dues 
of $1,100.00, family portion of the business trips of $1,500.00, and 
charitable contributions averaged over a period of four or five years 
and applied Sam Barber's ownership percentage in each of the companies 
to arrive at a total annual salary for Sam Barber of $123,600.00 (R 
at 1038-1043). Sam Barber's net monthly take home pay would be 
computed by multiplying his monthly gross earnings by 66%, considering 
his federal and state income tax bracket (R at 1028, 1029). 
Defendant, Sam Barber, also called Kent G. Schmidt, as a business 
evaluator (R at 280). Mr. Schmidt is employed by National Business 
Brokers, Inc. (R at 280). Mr. Schmidt is a high school graduate and 
has taken two to two and a half (2 1/2) years of accounting at Steven 
Henager's College of Business (R at 281). Mr. Schmidt does not have 
Bachelor's Degree from any college (R at 281). Mr. Schdmit is not a 
CPA. (R at 282). In 1977, Mr. Schmidt moved to Southern California 
and started National Business Broker's, Inc (R at 284, 285). 
National Business Brokers is a brokerage firm that sells 
automobile dealerships as well as other types of businesses (R at 
287). Kent Schmidt testified the basis for his valuation is what a 
willing buyer would pay to a willing seller, both of whom have full 
knowledge and are not acting under duress to either purchase or sell 
(R at 293). He testified the valuation of a business in a marital 
distribution case would be calculated the same as where a sale 
actually takes place (R at 294) . 
Kent Schmidt valued only the three auto dealerships of the five 
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Barber Brothers companies, i.e., Barber Bros. Pontiac Oldsmobile, 
Barber Bros. Motor Company, and Barber Bros. Imports (R at 296). 
In valuing those three businesses, he used a Rule of Thumb method 
(R at 307). In calculating the income of the Pontiac-Olds dealership 
he used a five (5) year average (R at 3 09). Kent Schmidt testified 
he added most of the charitable contributions taken as expenses back 
into the income of the Pontiac Oldsmobile Dealership leaving out a 
minimal portion (R at 309). Kent Schmidt valued the Barber Brothers 
Pontiac Oldsmobile dealership at $814,536.00 (R at 320). 
He then deducted a marketability discount of 20% (R at 321). A 
marketability discount was taken as there was no liquidity to sell 
that stock on the open market as readily as in the stock market where 
you can call your broker and have your money out in seven days (R at 
321). Sam Barber's interest in the Pontiac Oldsmobile dealership 
considering he owns 51.5%, and after deducting a marketability 
discount of 20%, came to $335,589.00 (Page 5 of 5 Exhibit 13). 
Kent Schmidt valued the Barber Brothers Motor Company at 
$996,000.00 (R at 328). Mr. Schmidt deducted a 30% minority interest 
discount from the Barber Brothers Motor Company valuation (R at 331, 
332) and also took a 20% marketability discount (R at 333). After 
deducting all discounts, the valuation of the Motor Company was 
$558,198.00 (R at 334). Considering Sam Barber's ownership interest 
is 39%, his interest in the Motor Company is $217,697.00. (Page 5 of 
5 of Exhibit 14). 
In valuing the Barber Brothers Import dealership, Kent Schmidt 
also took a minority and marketability discount (R at 338). He 
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valued Sam Barber's interest in the Import Company considering his 
ownership percentage and deducting marketability and minority interest 
discounts to be $21,294.00 (Page 5 of 5 Exhibit No. 15). 
Kent Schmidt did not prepare a valuation for the Barber Brothers 
Automotive Services Company nor was he asked to do so by Sam Barber 
(R at 342). Kent Schmidt was not asked to value the Limited 
Partnership (R at 343). Kent Schmidt acknowledged the Barber 
Brothers appeared to be a workable family organization (R at 346). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Child support and alimony issue. The trial court erred in 
determining Sam Barber's monthly gross earnings to be $8,025.00 
($96,300.00 per annum). The trial court ruled it would be inequitable 
and a "double charge" to add charitable contributions paid by the 
Barber Brothers companies both to the value of the businesses for 
valuation purposes and to Sam Barber's personal income for purposes of 
determining alimony and child support. 
Sam Barber's portion of the charitable contributions made by the 
Barber Brothers companies to his church and other charities should be 
imputed to his income for purposes of computing child support. 
Business expenses taken by Barber Brothers for advertising and 
promotions exceed the industry average by approximately ten (10%). 
Under Section 78-45-7.5 (4) (a) U.C.A., it is not reasonable nor 
necessary for a business to have above average advertising expenses 
and also claim as operating expense charitable contributions paid to 
the owner's church and other charities. The Barber Brothers companies 
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have elected to be taxed as Subchapter "S" corporations to avoid double 
taxation. Charitable contributions are written off as a business 
expense rather than paid to the individual owners who would have to 
declare the funds as personal income to themselves. 
By failing to consider as income to Sam Barber the charitable 
contributions made by the Barber Brothers companies on his behalf, the 
trial court awarded insufficient child support and alimony to Patricia 
Barber. The trial court in effect ordered Patricia Barber to support 
herself by utilizing the monthly pay out she was awarded instead of 
awarding reasonable alimony based on Sam Barber's true compensation. 
Alimony should not automatically terminate after eighteen (18) years 
and five (5) months as Patricia Barber thereafter will not be able to 
maintain the standard of living the parties enjoyed during their 
marriage. 
2. Business Valuation Issue. The trial court erred by taking a 
minority interest discount of 30% and a marketability discount of 20% 
in calculating Sam Barber's interest in the Barber Brothers companies. 
In this case, there is no justification to take a marketability nor 
minority interest discount as the businesses will not be sold and 
shall continue in the hands of the present owner, Sam Barber. The 
standard of value in a marital dissolution case should be the value 
between husband and wife, that is to the marital comunity, not between 
a hypothetical buyer and seller of the business interests. 
The trial court erred in excluding the capitalization of excess 
earnings method in reaching its final value of Sam Barber's business 
interests. The capitilization of excess earnings method is probably 
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the most common method used for valuing goodwill in a business. The 
method is recommended by the AICPA and relied upon the IRS to value a 
business for tax purposes. It is widely recognized by many 
jurisdictions in valuing business interests in marital dissolution 
cases. The trial court should have excluded Mark Papanikolas' 
valuation as he is Sam Barber's personal CPA and advisor. 
The trial court made a clerical error in Finding No. 42 wherein 
the court averaged the post discount valuations of the four business 
appraisers. The trial court used the sum of $473,700.00 as Mark 
Papanikolas valuation. Mark Papanikolas indicated in his testimony he 
would increase his valuation of $473,700.00 (R at 917) by $20,000.00 
for a tax benefit not previously considered by him, and by $69,000.00 
for additional depreciation for fixed assets, (R at 918) resulting in 
a total valuation of $562,700.00 (R at 965). 
3. Valuation and attorney fees. 
The trial court should have ordered Sam Barber to contribute 
toward Patricia Barber's valuation fees as the court ordered the 
parties to update David Dorton's 1993 valuation report. The trial 
court ordered Patricia Barber to pay all of David Dorton's fee. Sam 
Barber has used Barber Brothers to pay at least $18,000 of his 
appraisal and attorney fees as of the trial date. Sam Barber should 
be ordered to pay attorney fees incurred by Patricia Barber on appeal 
because of the errors made by the trial court. 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE IMPUTED 
TO SAM BARBER'S PERSONAL INCOME 
PAYMENTS MADE FOR CHARITABLE CON-
TRIBUTIONS BY HIS BUSINESSES 
Trial in the above-entitled matter was held in February, 1996 
over six (6) days. Sam Barber had not prepared his 1995 income tax 
return as of the trial date. However, he had received a 1995 W-2 from 
the Woods Cross Pontiac Oldsmobile dealership indicating a W-2 salary 
of $87,884.00 (See Exhibit 4). In 1994, the last year in which Sam 
Barber actually filed a tax return before trial, he reported W-2 wages 
of $78,817.00 (R at 97, Exhibit No. 4). His base salary was paid by 
the Barber Brothers Pontiac-Oldsmobile dealership located in Woods 
Cross, Utah. Sam Barber owns 51.50% of stock in Barber Brothers 
Pontiac-Oldsmobile, Inc. The Pontiac Oldsmobile dealership is a 
corporation that has elected to be taxed as Subchapter "S" corporation 
(R at 116). Therefore, 51.50% of the corporation income flows through 
to Sam Barber on his personal tax return (R at 116). 
In 1994, Sam Barber reported a total personal income of 
$350,607.00 as per his income tax return (R at 117, Exhibit No. 6). 
On his 1994 personal income tax return (Exhibit No. 6) in addition to 
wages of $78,817.00, Sam Barber reported income from partnerships and 
S corporations to be $265,908.00 (Schedule E, Exhibit 6). Those 
earnings, together with his wages and interest earned total 
$350,607.00. 
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Sam Barber deducted on his 1994 personal income tax return 
$3 9,757.00 in charitable contributions pursuant to Schedule A, 
Itemized Deductions (Exhibit 6). By doing so, Sam Barber reduced his 
taxable income by $3 9,757.00. In 1994, Sam Barber paid taxes on 
income of $280,771.00 (Line 37, Exhibit 6). Sam Barber admitted if 
the Pontiac Olds Dealership were taxed as a "C" corporation instead of 
a "S" corporation in 1994, he would have had to necessarily claim 
$39,757.00 as additional compensation (R at 124). 
In 1994, Sam Barber's Pontiac-Olds dealership paid total 
charitable contributions of $66,646.00 (Defendant's Exhibit 62). The 
other dealerships made additional charitable contributions as well 
(See Exhibit 6, Schedule E). Of the charitable contribution made in 
1994 by all of the Barber Brothers companies Sam Barber's share was 
$39,757.00. (Exhibit 6, Schedule A). 
In Exhibit 79, Sam Barber listed his average monthly living 
expenses (R at 1221). He did not list any charitable contributions 
on his monthly living expenses (R at 1221). Sam Barber stated there 
was a reason for that since he did not pay them (R at 1221). Sam 
Barber testified the Barber Brothers companies paid the charitable 
contributions to his church and other charities (R at 1221). Sam 
Barber testified his businesses paid charitable contributions in 
addition to above average promotion and advertising expenses (R at 
1221). When asked if payment of the charitable contributions by the 
businesses was an election on his part, Sam Barber responded that's a 
choice my brothers and I have made because we feel we're obligated to 
do so because of our spiritual convictions (R at 1222). 
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Kevin Yeanoplos, a CPA, in response to whether Sam Barber could 
claim charitable contributions if the Barber Brothers companies were a 
"C" corporation rather than a "S" corporation, stated, the owners of a 
"C" corporation are double taxed (R at 442). So what you will find 
many times with a "C" Corporation is there is an incentive to pull 
money out of a "C" corporation as salary which is deductible (R at 
442). On the "S" corporation side, we don't have that problem so we 
can pull it out as salary or we can pull it out as contributions 
without it being overtaxed (R at 442). 
Mr. Yeanoplos testified with a "S" corporation, the Internal 
Revenue Service does not consider charitable contributions as an 
operating expense. It is reported separately to the shareholder and 
flows through to the individual shareholders (R at 443). 
Sam Barber and his brothers have elected to be taxed as a "S" 
corporation in most of the Barber Brothers companies, to avoid double 
taxation. Charitable contributions made to Sam Barber's church and 
favorite charities are paid by his companies before he receives 
reported wages and salary as per his W-2. The taxable income of his 
various companies is reduced by the amount of charitable contribution 
expenses. 
Sam Barber could easily elect to receive the amount of 
charitable contributions as personal compensation instead of 
charitable contributions. He does not choose to do so to avoid paying 
taxes. Such funds are available as a resource for Sam Barber to pay 
for his buy out of Patricia Barber's business interest as well as pay 
alimony and child support. Sam Barber's share of Barber Brother's 
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charitable contributions expense should be imputed to him as income. 
The trial court in Finding of Fact No. 9, ruled: 
the value of the charitable contributions 
paid by the entities in which Mr. Barber 
owns a business interest, should not be 
attributable to Sam Barber's personal income. 
The contributions were added back into the 
income stream of the business by each of the 
business appraisals and then multiplied by a 
factor of 1.25 to 4.5, depending on the valu-
ation to establish the value of the businesses. 
Mrs. Barber is receiving one-half of the value 
of Mr. Barber's business interests. It would 
be inequitable and a "double charge" to add the 
charitable contributions both to the value of 
the businesses for valuation purposes and to 
Mr. Barber's personal income for purposes of 
computing alimony and child support. 
The trial court's Finding No. 9 is erroneous. A business 
valuator values a particular business based upon the income stream 
that business can produce. However, in this case the income stream 
generated is diminished by an expense for charitable contributions. 
Business valuators, called by Patricia Barber eliminated the 
charitable contributions as valid business expenses to determine the 
true income of the businesses. The business valuators added the 
charitable contributions back to income as they were not a legitimate 
business expense and they wanted to "normalize earnings". Sam 
Barber's business evaluators allowed charitable contributions as a 
business expense up to 5% of income. 
The expenses taken for charitable contributions could at the 
election of the four brothers be classified as compensation to them, 
thereby becoming a legitimate business expense. From that 
compensation, the brothers then could make their own charitable 
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contributions to their church and other charities. However, the 
brothers have elected to be taxed as a "S" corporation to avoid double 
taxation. 
Kevin Yeanpolos made adjustments to normalize the earnings of 
the businesses. In adjustment No. 12, found on page 17 of Kevin 
Yeanpolos' valuation, Exhibit No. 12, he deducted charitable 
contributions as a non operating expense, however, in adjustment No. 
6, found on page 16, he increased compensation for each of the three 
Barber brothers having management responsibilities for the 
dealerships, Sam Barber, Fred Barber, and Chuck Barber, for a five (5) 
year period ending December 31, 1995, by $214,700.00. 
In the case of In Re Marriage of Huff, 834 P.2d 244 (Colo. 1992), 
the husband also argued the trial court's use of his income to value 
his business interest and then again consider his income for alimony 
and child support purposes to be "double dipping". The Colorado 
Supreme Court held, 
the husband also argues that the 
District Court use of the excess 
earnings method results in a "double 
dipping" by the wife into the husband's 
income. The husband contends that the 
excess earnings approach converts his 
future income into property which is 
then divided between the spouses. He 
contends "double dipping" occurs because 
the same future income is the source from 
which the wife's maintenance is paid. The 
husband contends that the wife receives 
double benefits from the same source; the 
husband's future income. We disagree. 
As stated above, the excess earnings 
approach is a valuation method which 
capitalizes the excess earnings based 
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on a comparison of the husband's past 
earnings to the past earnings of an 
attorney in the same area with the same 
education, experience, and capabilities. 
Based on these historical earnings, this 
method provides a valuation which repre-
sents the present value of the husband's 
partnership interest. The excess earnings 
approach does not convert the husband's 
future income into property; on the con-
trary, it avoids valuing a business or 
partnership on the basis of post-divorce 
earnings and profits. See In Re Marriage 
Of Bookout, 222 P.2d 200, 204-205 (Colo. 
App. 19 91); Alan S. Zipp, Divorce Valuation 
Of Business Interest: A Capitalization of 
Earnings Approach, 23 Fam. L.Q. 89, 102 
(1989) . 
The net income of Barber Brothers is relevant to determine the 
present value of Sam Barber's various business interests as goodwill 
of a business is based upon "normalized earnings" . Sam Barber's 
compensation is relevant to determine appropriate child support and 
alimony which is a distinctly different issue. Sam Barber is not 
being double charged. 
In Traczke vs. Traczke, 891 P.2d 1277 (Okl. 1995), the Supreme 
Court of Oklahoma also ruled the trial court did not "double dip" into 
the husband's future income in considering goodwill of his medical 
practice as a factor in determining the value of marital property and 
also in awarding alimony to the wife. In Traczke, the husband argued 
that by allowing both goodwill to be divided as marital property and 
awarding support alimony, the trial court has charged him twice for 
his future income. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruled the goodwill 
of the husband's Bethany Foot Clinic, is not properly characterized as 
future income. Rather it is an asset of the clinic which is 
-32-
transferrable. See 891 P.2d at 1281. 
David Dorton also made adjustments for charitable contributions 
and salary as well (R at 685). Mr. Dorton stated he added back 
charitable contributions and we've adjusted the owner's compensation 
to an industry average of owner's compensation figure. On Page 17 of 
Exhibit 28, David Dorton's valuation, he stated owners' compensation 
has been adjusted to a level consistent with the average owner's 
compensation as a percent of sales for the automobile dealership 
industry as compiled by Robert Morris Associates in its annual 
statement studies (See Appendix A). Therefore, Patricia Barber's 
business valuators not only analyzed and made adjustments for 
charitable contributions, but also analyzed and made adjustments for 
compensation to the officers, including Sam Barber. 
II 
BY CALCULATING INSUFFICIENT PERSONAL 
INCOME TO SAM BARBER, THE TRIAL COURT 
FAILED TO AWARD APPROPRIATE CHILD SUPPORT 
AND ALIMONY. 
The trial court by failing to impute to Sam Barber's personal 
income charitable contributions to Sam Barber's personal income made 
by his companies has incorrectly calculated Sam Barber's gross income 
for child support purposes. In addition to paying charitable 
contributions to Sam Barber's church and his other charities, the 
Barber Brothers companies contributed approximately $18,000.00 to the 
time of trial toward Sam Barber's fees (R at 191). Payment of those 
attorney fees and appraisal fees are carried on Barber Brothers books 
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as accounts receivable from Sam Barber. Sam Barber testified if I can 
pay them, I will be required to pay them. It depends on the outcome 
of this trial (R at 191). Also, Sam Barber's income has also been 
reduced by depreciation taken on certain assets. Depreciation expense 
taken should be limited to a necessary and reasonable sum. See 
Section 78-45-7.5 (4) (a) , U.C.A. 
Section 78-45-7.5(4) (a), states that gross income from operation 
of a business shall be calculated by subtracting necessary expenses 
required for business operations from gross receipts. Only those 
expenses necessary to allow the business to operate at a reasonable 
level, may be deducted from gross receipts. 
It is submitted this statute does not permit Sam Barber the 
unlimited right to deduct charitable contributions, attorney and 
valuation fees, and depreciation from gross receipts available to him. 
Sam Barber's child support should be calculated on an annual income 
of $150,000.00 pursuant to plaintiff's Exhibit 3. Based upon Patricia 
Barber's monthly gross income of $1,213.00 and Sam Barber's monthly 
gross income of $12,500.00 ($150,000.00 per annum) child support for 
the support of Adrian Barber should be $950.00 per month. 
The trial court only awarded alimony to Patricia Barber of 
$300.00 per month through May, 1999, and $500.00 per month thereafter 
to the extent that alimony did not last longer than the parties' 
marriage of 18 years, 5 months. With respect to the alimony issue, the 
Court found that Sam Barber had a gross income of $8,025.00 per month. 
(Finding of Fact No. 46). After taxes, he had a monthly net income of 
$5,296.00. After paying child support of $687.00, Sam Barber had 
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$4,600.00 left per month. The Court then deducted the business buy 
out monthly payment to Patricia Barber of $2,117.00; thereby leaving 
disposable income of $2,4 92.0 0 per month to Sam Barber. 
The Court in effect is requiring Patricia Barber to pay for her 
monthly living expenses with her monthly business pay out. Commencing 
June 1, 1999, the business pay out will increase from $2,117.16 to 
$2,413.46 per month. The business pay out will be paid in full by 
February 1, 2016 and then shall terminate. Alimony awarded to 
Patricia Barber shall not last longer than the parties' marriage of 18 
years, five months. (Decree of Divorce, paragraph 12). If the Court 
found Sam Barber's true income was approximately $150,000.00, Sam 
Barber's monthly take home pay would be $8,250.00 as opposed to the 
trial court's finding of $5,296.00. Sam Barber has an additional 
$3,000 per month net income which should be considered in determining 
alimony. Patricia Barber should not be required to spend her 
business buy out for monthly living expenses. 
The trial court terminated alimony after 18 years, 5 months, at 
which time Patricia Barber will also have received all of her business 
buy out. At that point Sam Barber still retains his entire Barber 
Brothers business interests and has no obligation to Patricia Barber. 
Alimony awarded to Patricia Barber should be permanent. To the extent 
§ 30-3-5(7)(h) U.C.A. denies a property right of alimony to Patricia 
Barber the same is a denial of due process pursuant to Section 7 of 
the Constitution of Utah. 
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I l l 
ALIMONY SHOULD NOT AUTOMATICALLY 
TERMINATE ABSENT A SHOWING OF 
SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCE 
The trial court ordered alimony to Patricia Barber in the sum of 
$300.00 per month through May, 1999, and $500.00 per month thereafter 
to the extent that the alimony did not last longer than the parties' 
marriage of eighteen (18) years, five (5) months. It is too 
speculative for the Court to automatically assume that Patricia Barber 
will be able to support herself without alimony at or near a standard 
of living to which she became accustomed during the marriage. Absent, 
a showing of a material, substantial change of circumstance, alimony 
should not automatically terminate. Anderson vs. Anderson, 757 P.2d 
476, (Utah App. 1988). 
In order for the trial court to terminate the receiving spouse's 
alimony award, the trial court must be persuaded the receiving spouse 
will be able to support herself at a standard of living to which she 
was accustomed during the parties' marriage and further consider 
whether the payor spouse is no longer able to pay. Fullmer vs. 
Fullmer. 761 P.2d 942 (Utah App. 1988). 
The Utah Court of Appeals in Rudman vs. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73 (Utah 
App. 1991), ruled any future social security award to the wife was too 
speculative, absence a specific finding as to the date and amount of 
such future award to support automatic termination of alimony at the 
age of 65 years. 
Pursuant to Section 30-3-5(7) (h) , U.C.A. alimony may not be 
-36-
ordered for a duration longer than the number of years the marriage 
existed unless at any time prior to termination of alimony, the court 
finds extinuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony 
for longer period of time. 
In this case, the trial court in Finding of Fact No. 54, 
determined Sam Barber will likely receive larger future salary 
increases than Patricia Barber. Given the court's findings as to the 
average monthly expenses of Patricia Barber, and her limited ability 
to earn an income, and that the business buy out will terminate in 
February, 2016, it is clear without alimony Patricia Barber will not 
be able to maintain the standard of living she has come to enjoy 
during the parties' marriage. It was error for the trial court to 
order automatic termination of alimony. To the extent Patricia 
Barber's property right to alimony is denied after 18 years and 5 
months the same constitutes a denial of due process under Section 7 of 
the Constitution of Utah. 
IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN EXCLUDING 
THE CAPITALIZATION OF EXCESS 
EARNINGS METHOD IN VALUING SAM 
BARBER'S BUSINESS INTERESTS 
The trial court in Finding of Fact No. 29, found that Kevin 
Yeanoplos used two methods to value the Barber Brothers businesses. 
The first method was called a capitalization of earnings method which 
valued Sam Barber's interest at $1,276,000.00. The second methodology 
used by Mr. Yeanoplos was called the capitalization of excess earnings 
method, or treasury method, which valued Sam Barber's interest at $1.9 
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million. 
In Finding of Fact No. 30, the trial court found the 
capitalization of excess earnings or treasury method not creditable as 
applied to this case and chose to completely disregard it. The trial 
court found the method was so far out of line with the other 
valuations that it was completely unrealistic and the court had no 
confidence in it. Accordingly, the Court only considered Mr. 
Yeanoplos valuation of $1,276,000.00 and completely disregarded the 
capitalization of excess earnings method which valued Sam Barber's 
interest at $1.9 million. 
On page 24 of Exhibit 12, Kevin Yeanoplos' business valuation, he 
describes in detail the two methods he used to value Sam Barber's 
business interests. Mr. Yeanoplos referenced Revenue Ruling 59-60, 
which was later clarified by Revenue Ruling 68-609 in 1968, describing 
the two methods he used as the correct methods in valuing a business 
when comparable publicly traded companies cannot be found or if the 
company has not demonstrated a history of paying dividends. 
Mr. Yeanoplos, used both methods and weighed each methodolgy 
equally, then averaged the two to arrive at a final value of 
$1,602,000.00 for Sam Barber's collective interest. See page 28 of 
Exhibit 12. Even though Mr. Yeanoplos averaged his two methods, the 
trial court completely disregarded the capitalization of excess 
earnings method and relied solely on the capitalization of earnings 
method which valued Sam Barber's interest at $1,276,000.00. 
The two business evaluators called by Sam Barber, Kent Schmidt 
and Mark Papanikolas, both used a Rule of Thumb method to determine 
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the goodwill of the Barber Brothers companies. On Page ii of Exhibit 
16, Mark Papanikolas' valuation report, Mr. Papanikolas indicates his 
approach is to, 
consider the business as a whole and 
assumes the automotive and businesses 
will continue to carry on without any 
significant interruption. Assets 
values have been considered considered 
where appropriate. After determining 
the underlying asset values, a goodwill 
factor has been considered. For the three 
car dealerships and Barber Brothers Automotive 
Services goodwill has been added based on 
adjusted average earnings for the dealership 
and then multiplied by a factor of 1.25. 
Kent Schmidt in his reports called goodwill "going concern value", 
see Exhibits 13, 14, and 15. Mr. Schmidt relates under the Rule of 
Thumb method, valuation formulas for automobile dealerships are 
generally based on a multiple of the adjusted net operating income. 
The multipliers typically are between 1.25 and 2.0. This value, 
sometimes called "going concern value," is then added to the net worth 
of the corporation in order to arrive at the overall market value. 
The trial court accepted Kent Schmidt's and Mark Papanikolas' 
reports valuing the Barber Brothers companies. However, the Court 
rejected the capitalization of excess earnings method used by Mr. 
Yeanoplos. The capitalization of excess earning methods has been 
cited with approval for determining the value of goodwill and marital 
property division in a number of other jurisdictions. 
The excess earnings method is probaby the most common method used 
for valuing goodwill. See Brett R. Turner, Equitable Distribution of 
Property. Section 7.07 at 533 (2nd edition, 1994). Under this method, 
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one first computes the difference between the actual earnings of the 
business and the earnings of the average or reasonable business. This 
difference is then capitalized or multiplied by some number (the 
factor) between one and five. The goodwill value is then added to the 
value of the sum total of the tangible assets to reach the total value 
of a particular business. See Section 7.07 at 533. 
Allan S. Zipp, in Divorce Valuation of Business Interest, a 
Capitalization of Earnings Approach, 23 Fam.L.Q. 89, 102 (1989) states 
Capitalization of excess earnings 
approach is one of the methods re-
commended by the American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants and 
is a method relied on by the Internal 
Revenue Service to value a business 
for tax purposes. 
In the Colorado case of In Re: Marriage of Huff, 834 P.2d 244 
(Colo. 1992), the Colorado Supreme Court approved the excess earnings 
valuation method in a marriage dissolution case to value the 
husband/attorney's interest in his law firm. The Colorado court held 
the excess earnings valuation method is an appropriate valuation 
method in a dissolution proceeding because it provides the present 
value of the partnership interest and avoids the problem of valuing a 
business on the basis of post divorce earnings and profits. See 834 
P.2d at 256. 
Use of the capitalization of excess earnings method to determine 
the value of goodwill in a dissolution case was also cited with 
approval by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Dugan vs. Dugan, 92 N.J. 
423, 457 A.2d 1, 6 (1983) . 
In Skrabak vs. Skrabak, 673 A.2d 732 (MD App. 1996), the Court of 
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Appeals of Maryland ruled the trial court did not err in allowing the 
wife's expert to utilize the excess earnings method to determine the 
value of the husband's business. Skrabak cited three other decisions 
used by Maryland courts in discussing the excess earnings method as a 
proper method to value goodwill. 
In Endres vs. Endres, 532 N.W. 2d 65 (S.D. 1995), the Supreme 
Court of South Dakota cited with approval the trial court's valuation 
of goodwill in the husband's concrete business using the 
capitalization of excess earnings method. See 532 N.W. 2d at 69. 
In Endres. the Court referred to other jurisdictions which have 
approved the excess earnings method in valuing goodwill in marital 
property divisions: See Moffitt vs. Moffitt, 813 P.2d. 674, 676 
(Alaska 1991); Mitchell vs. Mitchell. 152 Ariz. 317, 732 P.2d 208, 214 
(1987); In Re Marriage of Hargrave. 163 Cal. App. 3d 346, 209 Cal. 
Rptr. 764, 770 (1985); In Re Marriage of Huff, 834 P.2d 244, 256 
(Colo. 1992); Loveland vs. Loveland. 91 Idaho 400, 422 P.2d 67, 69 
(1967); Porter vs. Porter. 526 N.E. 2d 219, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988); 
Walters vs. Walters. 419 S.W. 2d, 750, 752 (Ky. Ct. App. 1967); Nelson 
vs. Nelson. 411 N.W. 2d 868, 873 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Hull. 712 P.2d 
1317, 1322; Ford vs. Ford. 105 Nev. 672, 782 P.2d 1304, 1309 (1989); 
Dugan. 457 A.2d 1, 9; Hurley. 615 P.2d 256, 259; Finocchio vs. 
Finocchio. 162 A.D. 2d 1044, 556 N.Y.S. 2d 1007, 1099; McLean vs. 
McLean. 323 N.C. 543, 374 S.E. 2d 376, 385 (1988); Russell vs. 
Russell. 11 Va.App. 411, 399 S.E. 2d 166, 169 (1990); Marriage of 
Hall. 103 Wash.2d 236, 692 P.2d 175, 179-80 (1984); Spheeris vs. 
Spheeris. 37 Wis.2d 497, 155 N.W. 2d 130, 135 (1967); Neuman vs. 
-41-
Neuman. 842 P.2d 575, 581 (Wyo. 1992). See also 2 Valuation & 
Distribution of Marital Property,S 23.05(2) (b) (1995). 
The trial court in this case should have utilized Kevin Yeanoplos 
capitalization of excess earnings method. By failing to do so, the 
trial court has incorrectly valued Sam Barber's interest in the 
various Barber Brothers companies. The trial court thus failed to find 
Sam Barber's interest to be within the range of value established by 
all of the testimony in this case. See Morgan vs. Morgan. 854 P.2d at 
564. By using Kevin Yeanoplos two methods, the capitalization of 
earnings method, together with the capitalization of excess earnings 
method, the trial court would have valued Sam Barber's business 
interest at a significantly higher valuation. 
V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACCEPTING 
MARK PAPANIKOLAS' BUSINESS VALUATION 
The trial court should not have accepted the business valuation 
report prepared by Sam Barber's own CPA, Mark Papanikolas. Mr. 
Papanikolas is the accountant for all the Barber Brothers dealerships 
(R at 880.) Mark Papanikolas testified he had loaned $25,000.00 to 
Barber Brothers (R at 881). Additionally, his sister, Christine, 
loaned $200,000.00 to Barber Brothers (R at 881). Barber Brothers 
had been making interest payments only to Mark Papanikolas for the 
last three years (R at 966). Mark Papanikolas receives $2,000.00 
per month on behalf of his sister (R at 968). Also, as Barber 
Brothers CPA, Mr. Papanikolas bills out an average of $3,500.00 per 
month for his services (R at 969) . 
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Patricia Barber, in written closing arguments submitted to the 
trial court, argued Mark Papanikolas valuation should not be 
considered by the court based upon lack of independence and 
objectivity. In Exhibit 47, the AICPA states, in addition to being 
objective in providing evaluation services, the consultant needs to 
maintain the appearance of objectivity. The valuation consultant 
should be independent of the company being valued, i.e., there should 
be no ownership or other financial interest or family relationship. 
Also progress bills should be rendered and collected in a timely 
manner as the project progresses. This will keep a client from being 
able to exert undue influence on the outcome of the valuation 
engagement by threatening to withhold payments unless the value is 
either raised or lowered. 
Mark Papanikolas is receiving interest only payments on his 
$25,000.00 loan. Also, his sister, Christine's $200,000.00 loan, is 
due to be paid in full in a few years even though the same has been 
amortized over a longer period of time. Patricia Barber alleges it is 
not by accident that Mark Papanikolas' valuation is the lowest of all 
business valuators valuating Sam Barber's business interest. Due to 
lack of independence and objectivity, the trial court should not have 
received Mark Papanikolas business valuation and it was prejudicial 
error to do so. 
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VI 
THE TRIAL COURT INCORRECTLY VALUED 
SAM BARBER'S BUSINESS INTERESTS BY 
DEDUCTING MINORITY INTEREST DISCOUNTS 
AND MARKETABILITY DISCOUNTS 
Sam Barber's business valuator, Kent Schmidt, argued the trial 
court should take a discount for marketability and minority share 
discounts in this case. He explained a marketability discount is 
appropriate when no ready market exist. He testified that because of 
the limited market for selling a partial interest in a privately held 
company, a significant discount would likely need to be offered to 
sell such stock. 
Mark Papanikolas, Barber Brothers CPA, argued that most business 
valuators would apply the marketability and minority interest discount 
in valuing the businesses. He relied upon a treatise entitled Valuing 
Small Businesses and Professional Practices by Shannon Pratt, together 
with Exhibit 78, an excerpt from NADA Publication, A Dealer Guide to 
Valuing an Automobile Dealership. 
Both Kent Schmidt and Mark Papanikolas indicated their valuation 
was based upon a theory that fair market value was determined between 
a willing buyer and a willing seller neither acting under any 
compulsion to buy or sell and acting with full knowledge. 
The trial court should not have valued Sam Barber's interest in 
the various Barber Brothers companies based upon a sale value but 
based up what the business is worth to the marital community. The 
most important difference between a matrimonial valuation and the 
value the businesses would bring in an actual sale is the fact that 
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there will be no sale of Sam Barber's interest. No willing buyer is 
negotiating a price with a willing seller. Under the willing buyer 
standard, value is determined from the perspective of a hypothetical 
investor. Under the divorce value standard, value is determined from 
the prospective of the present owner. The presumption in a divorce 
valuation and especially in this case is the business will not be sold 
and will continue to remain in the hands of the present owner, Sam 
Barber. Since the standard of value is to the marital community, 
there is no justification to discount its value for lack of 
marketability, Alan S. Zipp, Business Valuation For Divorce. 
In Weston vs. Weston. 773, P2d 408 (Utah App. 1989), the trial 
court did not include a discount for lack of marketability of stock of 
a closely held corporation. Footnote No. 1 found on page 410 of 
Weston indicates the trial court may have been influenced by the fact 
that the remainder of stock was solely owned by members of plaintiff's 
family, therefore, the most likely potential buyers of plaintiff's 
stock. 
Such is the case here, if in fact, Sam Barber sells his interest. 
It would most likely be sold to his brothers and therefore, there is a 
ready market for his stock. However, it is more likely that Sam 
Barber who was 45 years of age at the time of trial, is going to 
continue to remain in business and his stock will not be sold and 
therefore no marketability discount should be taken. 
In Morgan vs. Morgan. 854 P.2d 559, (Utah App. 1993) the trial 
court rejected the application of the minority interest discount 
factor in valuing partnership property. The trial court held that Dr. 
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Morgan would not be forced into a liquidation of his business interest 
which would result in a minority discount for his interest. 
The Court is not convinced, however, 
that a forced liquidation of the 
minority interest is necessary or 
imminent and that it would be un-
realistic and inequitable to apply 
such a minority discount under the 
the circumstances of this case. 854 
P.2d at 565. 
VII 
THE TRIAL COURT MADE A CLERICAL ERROR 
IN CALCULATING SAM BARBER'S BUSINESS 
INTERESTS 
The trial court has made a clerical error in averaging the values 
of the business evaluators. In Finding of Fact No. 42, the trial 
court determined Sam Barber's business interest should be calculated 
by taking an average of the post discount valuations of the four 
appraisers, Kevin Yeanoplos, David Dorton, Kent Schmidt, and Mark 
Papanikolas. The trial court excluded Kevin Yeanoplos' valuation under 
the capitalization of excess earnings method. The Court in its 
calculations used the correct mathematical figure of post discount 
valuations for Kevin Yeanoplos, David Dorton, and Kent Schmidt. 
However, the Court used an erroneous figure of $473,700.00 for Mark 
Papanikolas. 
Page 1 of Exhibit 16, indicates the total post discount valuation 
of Sam Barber's business interest as determined by Mark Papanikolas 
was $473,700.00. However, Mark Papanikolas in his testimony indicated 
he would make two changes to his valuation of $473,700.00. Mr. 
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Papanikolas indicated he had changed his mind and believed a portion 
of the depreciated book value of fixed assets should be added back in 
order to arrive at a higher number for the value of fixed assets (R 
at 918). That change would raise Sam Barber's value by $69,000.00 (R 
at 918) . 
Mr. Papanikolas also testified that Debra Kelley raised one 
additional point that he thought warranted a change in his valuation 
(R at 954). The books for Barber Brothers Automotive Services 
established reserves for future claims made on warranties. Since the 
Internal Revenue Service does not allow the reserves to be deducted 
the year they were established deferring a deduction until they are 
actually paid, the effect was Barber Brothers prepaid income taxes (R 
at 954). Mark Papanikolas computed that change would increase Sam 
Barber's value by $20,000.00. (R at 954). 
Mark Papanikolas therefore valued Sam Barber's total interest in 
the various Barber Brothers companies at $562,700.00; that is, 
$473,700.00, plus $69,000.00, plus $20,000.00. 
The Court in Finding of Fact No. 42 intended to average the four 
appraisers as follows: 
$ 83 7,92 0.0 0 Kevin Yeanoplos 
$ 885,272.00 David Dorton 
$ 723,049.00 Kent Schmidt 
$ 562,700.00 Mark Papanikolas 
$3,008,941.00 
Therefore, the average of the four appraisers is $752,235.00 with 
Patricia Barber's one-half being $376,117.62. 
The correct figure for Kent Schmidt's valuation is $723,049.00 
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rather than $716,383.00. In Finding No. 32, because Kent Schmidt did 
not value Barber Brothers Automotive Services, Inc. or the Family 
Partnership, the trial court took an average of the post discount 
value of Barber Brothers Automotive Services prepared by Kevin 
Yeanoplos, David Dorton, and Mark Papanikolas. However, to the figure 
of $59,700.00 for Mark Papanikolas, we have to add $20,000.00 for the 
warranty reserves change, thereby increasing that to $79,700.00. 
Therefore, the average of the three valuations is $85,553.00. Adding 
the sum of $574,580.00 found in Finding of Fact No. 31 for the three 
car dealerships, plus $62,916.00 for the Family Partnership, and 
$85,553.00 for Automotive Services amounts to $723,049.00. 
VIII 
THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD ORDER SAM BARBER 
TO CONTRIBUTE TOWARD PAYMENT OF PATRICIA 
BARBER'S VALUATION AND ATTORNEY FEES 
Sam Barber should be ordered to pay $3,900.00 toward David 
Dorton's valuation fees. Judith Dawn Barking, Sam Barber's previous 
counsel, testified the Domestic Relations Commissioner recommended 
David Dorton's 1993 business evaluation be updated and the parties 
share equally the cost to update the same. (R at 123 9). Mr. Dorton's 
valuation fees was to be shared equally and payment of the fees to 
update the business valuation were preserved as an issue for trial. 
(R at 1239). 
Sam Barber testified he paid his attorney fees and valuation fees 
up to the point he could no longer pay them because the costs were too 
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high (R at 191). Barber Brothers paid approximately $18,000.00 
toward his attorney and valuation fees as of the trial date. Those 
fees are carried as accounts receivable on the company's books due 
from Sam Barber. Sam Barber testified if I can pay these accounts 
receivable, I will be required to pay them, it depends on what happens 
after this trial (R at 191). In the past, Barber Brothers has 
written off accounts receivable due from Sam Barber for taxes and 
family orthodontic expense (R at 191, 192). 
Sam Barber is in a much stronger financial position to pay the 
business valuation fees inasmuch as he uses the deep pocket of his 
businesses to pay for his attorney and valuation fees. It is 
reasonable that Sam Barber contribute $3,900.00 toward payment of 
David Dorton's valuation fees. 
Patricia Barber also requests Sam Barber pay her attorney fees on 
appeal because of the errors made by the trial court resulting in 
prejudice to her. Patricia Barber is in need of having her attorney 
fees paid and Sam Barber has the ability to pay her fees. 
CONCLUSION 
Patricia Barber requests the trial court be ordered to calculate 
Sam Barber's annual income at $150,000.00 per annum considering his 
companies pay his charitable contributions, attorney and valuation 
fees, and depreciation taken from his businesses's gross receipts. 
The trial court should be ordered to base the child support and 
alimony award upon Sam Barber earning $150,000.00 per year. The trial 
court should be ordered not to automatically terminate Patricia 
Barber's alimony after 18 years and 5 months; the same should be made 
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permanent. The trial court should be ordered to receive the 
capitalization of excess earnings method as a proper method to 
calculate Sam Barber's business interest. The trial court should be 
ordered not to deduct marketability and minority interest discounts as 
Sam Barber's business interests are not being sold. Mark 
Papanikolas's valuation should be excluded because of his lack of 
objectivity and independence being Sam Barber's personal CPA. All 
clerical errors in valuing Barber Brothers should be corrected. Sam 
Barber should contribute toward payment of Patricia Barber's business 
appraisal fees and for attorney fees on appeal. 
DATED this ^/ day of January, 1998. 
ROBERT L. NEELI 
Attorney for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant, Patricia Barber 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) true and correct copies 
of the foregoing Brief of Appellant, Patricia Barber, postage prepaid, 
this ^j c^tay of January, 1998, to Douglas B. Thomas, 635-25th Street, 
Ogden, Utah 844 01 
ROBERT L. NEEEEY 
Attorney for Appellant/ 
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DOUGLAS B. THOMAS (5550) 
Attorneys for Defendant 
GRIDLEY, WARD, HAVAS, SHAW & THOMAS 
635 25th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 621-3317 
Facsimile: (801) 621-3 340 
IN THE JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
PATRICIA BARBER, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
SAM JOHN BARBER, JR., 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
RE: ALL ISSUES RELATING 
TO DIVORCE 
Judge: Michael D. Lyon 
Civil No. 924901656DA 
ooOoo 
Trial of the above-entitled matter regarding all issues 
pertaining to the parties' divorce came on regularly before the 
Court on February 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 21 and 28, 1996, before the 
Honorable Michael D. Lyon. Plaintiff was present and represented 
by her attorney, Robert L. Neeley and Defendant was present and 
represented by his attorney Douglas B. Thomas of the law firm of 
Gridley, Ward, Havas, Shaw and Thomas. The Court having heard 
extensive testimony presented by the parties and their experts and 
having carefully reviewed the evidence, memoranda and post-trial 
arguments submitted by the parties and being.fully advised in the 
premises, hereby enters its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties were initially married on September 10, 1971. 
The parties were later divorced. The parties remarried on 
September 10, 1977. 
2. This matter was bifurcated and the Plaintiff was granted 
a divorce from Defendant pursuant to a hearing held on January 29, 
1996. The divorce was final on February 7, 1996. The parties were 
married 18 years, 5 months. 
3. Two children have been born as issue of the second 
marriage, Angela, born December 25, 1977 and Adrian, born May 29, 
1981. 
4. At the time of the divorce, Mrs. Barber was age 44 and 
Mr. Barber was age 45. 
5. The parties have stipulated that Plaintiff shall be 
awarded the sole care, custody and control of the minor children, 
subject to the Defendant's standard rights of visitation. 
6. Plaintiff is employed at Dillard's as a retail sales 
clerk in the amount of $1,213.00 per month. 
7. Defendant is employed by Barber Bros. Pontiac-Oldsmobile 
in the approximate amount of $86,000 per year. The Court finds 
that the Defendant testified that he currently earns a base salary 
in the amount of $78,000 per year plus an average annual bonus of 
$8,000. In addition, the Defendant receives approximately $6,600 
annually in personal automobile use for himself and the parties' 
2 
daughter Angela plus $600 per year in the personal use of credit 
cards, $500 per year in the personal use of a cabin owned by his 
business interests, health club dues in the annual amount of $1,100 
per year and $1,500 for the family's portion of business trips 
taken by Mr. Barber. Totalling these amounts together, the Court 
finds that Mr. Barber has an annual income of $96,300 including 
automobile use and the value of his perks, which amounts to a 
monthly income of $8,025. 
8. Based on the parties' incomes as set forth above, the 
Defendant shall pay child support to Plaintiff in the amount of 
$687 per month pursuant to the Utah Child Support Guidelines. 
9. The Court finds that the value of the charitable 
contributions paid by the entities in which Mr. Barber owns a 
business interest should not be attributable to Mr. Barber's 
personal income. The contributions were added back into the income 
stream of the businesses by each of the business appraisers and 
then multiplied by a factor of 1.25 to 4.5, depending on the 
valuation, to establish the value of the businesses. Mrs. Barber 
is receiving one-half of the value of Mr. Barber's business 
interests. It would be inequitable and a "double charge" to add 
the charitable contributions both to the value of the businesses 
for valuation purposes and to Mr. Barber's personal income for 
purposes of computing alimony and child support. 
10. The parties own real estate acreage in Roosevelt, Utah 
that shall be sold and equally divided between the parties after 
3 
costs associated with selling the property are deducted. A 
qualified realtor shall be engaged to list the property the 
property for sale. 
11. Plaintiff shall be awarded the marital home located at 
4685 Porter Ave., South Ogden, Utah. The home has a fair market 
value of $95,000 with a first mortgage balance of $77,000 leaving 
$18,000 equity which should be divided equally by the parties. The 
Defendant's equity of $9,000 shall be deducted from the Plaintiff's 
share of the Defendant's business interests as outlined below. 
12. Each party shall be awarded the personal property 
currently in their own possession. 
13. Mrs. Barber should return the automobile that is in her 
possession to the business. Mr. Barber should not be responsible 
for providing Mrs. Barber with any automobile for her use. 
14. The parties shall each be entitled to one half of the 
$1,800 currently held by Defendant in an IRA account. 
15. Mr. Barber owns a business interest in five entities. He 
owns a 51.5 percent interest in Barber Bros. Pontiac-Oldsmoblie, 
a 39.03 percent interest in Barber Bros. Motor Co., a 44 percent 
interest in Barber Bros. Imports, a 25 percent interest in Barber 
Bros. Automotive Services, and a 25 percent interest in Barber 
Bros. Family Partnership. The remaining interests are held in 
varying degrees by Mr. Barber's three brothers, Charles, Fred and 
John. 
16. Barber Bros. Imports, Barber Bros. Pontiac-Olds, and 
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Barber Bros. Automotive Services are all subchapter S Corporations. 
Barber Bros. Motor Co. is regular subchapter "C" corporation. 
Barber Bros. Family Partnership is, as the name indicates, a 
partnership. Sam Barber actively manages only the Barber Bros. 
Pontiac-Olds dealership. He is not involved in the day-to-day 
operation of the other entities. 
17. The Court finds that all of the Barber Bros, entities are 
undercapitalized and cannot sustain a substantial capital 
withdrawal without endangering the businesses. 
18. The Court finds that the automobile industry is very 
cyclical. The Court finds that the sales year of 1994 was somewhat 
of an aberration in that it produced substantially higher sales 
than in other years. 
19. The Court finds that the value of the Oldsmobile 
franchise has substantially dropped in recent years in terms of 
sales. The Court further finds that General Motors Project 2000 is 
a real issue that will cause a consolidation in franchising. There 
is a very high probability that the Oldsmobile franchise will be 
lost to the Barber Bros. Pontiac-Olds dealership within the next 
three years. Although General Motors will provide the dealership 
with some form of a buyout for this franchise, the Court finds that 
it will not likely amount to a great deal of money. 
20. Although there is no guarantee that the Pontiac-Olds 
dealership will keep the Pontiac franchise, the Court finds that 
Mr. Barber runs a very good business and that he will very likely 
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keep the Pontiac line. 
21. Four separate business appraisers valued Mr. Barber's 
business interests and presented testimony and valuations to the 
Court. The Court finds that the methods involved in valuing the 
businesses did not involve a precise science but involved critical 
junctures where the valuators could exercise substantial 
discretion. 
22. Mrs. Barber presented two business valuations, one by 
Kevin Yeanoplos which valued Mr. Barber's business interests at 
$1.6 million, and a second by David Dorton which valued the 
businesses at $1,351,300. Mr. Dorton had in fact valued the 
business interests on two prior occasions pursuant to this divorce 
action and had valued Mr. Barber's interests at $662,500 in a 
valuation dated April 30, 1995, effective December 31, 1993. 
23. The Court is critical of Plaintiff's valuations for 
several reasons. First, neither Mr. Yeanoplos nor Mr. Dorton 
factored in the risks of the General Motors Project 2000 
restructuring of dealerships into their valuations. The Court 
finds that the restructuring by General Motors presents a very real 
and substantial likelihood that the Oldsmobile line will be lost by 
the Pontiac-Olds dealership within the next three years. 
24. Second, neither Mr. Yeanoplos nor Mr. Dorton took into 
account the cyclical nature of the automobile dealership in their 
valuations. Mr. Dorton's credibility was particularly strained 
because he dramatically increased (approximately doubled) the value 
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of Mr. Barber's business interests solely based on sales in 1994, 
which was unusual in that it was the best year the automotive 
industry had ever had, and to a lesser extent on 1995. 
25. Third, both Mr. Dorton and Mr. Yeanoplos based their 
valuations on Mr. Barber's continued skills, talents and abilities 
in operating the businesses. Yet Mr. Barber testified that at the 
values contained in Plaintiff's appraisals he could not keep the 
businesses and they would need to be sold. The Court found this 
testimony credible and supported by the evidence. 
26. Fourth, the businesses are currently undercapitalized. 
If Mr. Barber attempted to make a 20 year payout to Mrs. Barber 
based on the $1.2 million or $1.35 million values suggested by Mr. 
Yeanoplos and Mr. Dorton, Mr. Barber would need to raid the 
businesses to try to meet the obligation which would further 
undercapitalize the businesses and compound the problem. 
27. Finally, neither Mr. Yeanoplos nor Mr. Dorton considered 
minority or marketability discounts nor the effect of'capital gains 
taxes if Mr. Barber's interests need to be sold. 
28. The Court finds that Mr. Yeanoplos has had no experience 
in valuing an automobile dealership and very little in-depth 
experience in appraising other types of businesses, having 
primarily operated at a superficial level and giving opinions over 
the telephone. 
29. The Court finds that Mr. Yeanoplos utilized two methods 
to value the businesses, the capitalization of earnings method, 
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which valued Mr. Barber's interests at $1,276,000, and the 
capitalization of excess earnings or treasury method which valued 
the interests at $1.9 million. 
30. The Court finds the capitalization of excess earnings or 
treasury method not credible as applied to this matter and chooses 
to disregard it completely. This method was so far out of line 
with the other valuations that it was completely unrealistic and 
the Court had no confidence in it. Accordingly, the Court will 
only consider Mr. Yeanoplos's valuation at $1,276,000. 
31. Mr. Barber also presented two business valuations. Mark 
Papanikolas, the CPA for the Barber Bros, entities, valued 
Mr. Barber's interests at $473,700. Kent Schmidt valued only Mr. 
Barber's interests in the three car dealerships: Barber Bros. 
Pontiac Olds, Barber Bros. Imports and Barber Bros. Motor Co., 
which he valued at a total of $574,580. 
32. Because Mr. Schmidt did not value the Automotive Services 
or Family Partnership businesses, the Court has taken an average of 
the after-discount value (more fully explained in paragraphs 3 5 and 
41 below) of the other three valuations for Automotive Services 
($90,160 - Yeanoplos; $86,800 - Dorton; ($59,700 - Papanikolas) and 
imputed to Mr. Schmidt a value of $78,886 for the Automotive 
Services. The Court has taken an after-discount average of only 
Mr. Dorton's and Mr. Yeanoplos's figures ($64,960 - Yeanoplos; 
$60,872 - Dorton) for the Family Partnership imputing to Mr. 
Schmidt a value of $62,916 for that entity. With these 
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imputations, Mr. Schmidt's total business value equals $716,383. 
33. The Court finds Mr. Schmidt's valuation and testimony 
highly credible. Mr. Schmidt has vast years of experience in 
valuing automobile businesses and has valued over 100 automobile 
dealerships and franchises. The Court finds that he had 
substantial practical hands-on insight and experience. The Court 
finds that the methodology that Mr. Schmidt used made a lot of 
sense and provided validation for the Court's assessment of the 
true value of Mr. Barber's business interests as set forth below. 
34. The Court initially struggled with Mr. Papanikolas's 
objectivity because of his long standing relationship with the 
Barber Bros, entities and his and his sister's financial dealings 
with certain of the entities. However, as the Court listened to 
Mr. Papanikolas's testimony at trial, the Court found his testimony 
to be credible and helpful. For example the Court finds his 
testimony regarding the applicability of minority and marketability 
discounts in this case to be reasonable and conservative. The 
Court finds his testimony to be honest and veracious. He had good 
insight into the automotive business as the accountant for the 
Barber Bros, entities for a number of years and as an accountant 
for another dealership. The Court also gave his testimony 
credibility because he understood Project 2000. He understood the 
cyclical nature of the automobile industry and the precarious 
nature of the Oldsmobile franchise. The Court, therefore, elects 
to utilize his valuation to provide perspective to the decision as 
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set forth below. 
35. The Court finds that a minority discount of 3 0 percent 
(except in the Pontiac-Olds dealership) and a marketability 
discount of 20 percent is reasonable and conservative and should be 
applied to the valuations of Mr. Dorton and Mr. Yeanoplos. Similar 
discounts were already taken by Mr. Schmidt and Mr. Papanikolas. 
There are several reasons why discounts are appropriate in this 
case, any one of which would support the Court's decision to apply 
the discounts. 
36. First, the credible testimony at trial clearly indicated 
that Mr. Barber does not exercise control over his brothers and 
does not exercise day-to-day responsibility over the businesses 
other than the Pontiac-Olds dealership. Even in the Pontiac-Olds 
store, Mr. Barber is not free to simply do whatever he wishes 
without ruining the working relationship he has with his brothers. 
These constraints limit the value of the stock in the entities 
which Mr. Barber owns a minority interest, both to Mr. Barber and 
to any possible future investor. 
37. Second, the undercapitalization problems, in the 
businesses, Project 2000 and other risks associated with the 
business, combined with Mr. Barber's financial obligations pursuant 
to this divorce, create a real possibility that Mr. Barber will 
need to sell a portion or all of his interests in the foreseeable 
future. At that time, Mr. Barber will not only likely sustain 
these discounts, but could also likely suffer a very substantial 
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capital gain tax based on his low tax basis in the business. 
Accordingly, the Court finds that Mr. Schmidt's and Mr. 
Papnikolas's use of these discounts in their valuations is 
appropriate and that it is fair and equitable that these discounts 
be applied to Mr. Dorton's and Mr. Yeanoplos's valuations. 
38. Third, the Court specifically finds Mr. Papanikolas's 
reliance on the treatises Valuing Small Businesses and Professional 
Practices by Shannon Pratt, The Estate Planning and Taxation 
Coordinator, and the NADA Publication: A Dealer Guide to 
Valuing an Automobile Dealership was appropriate in determining the 
discounts in this matter. 
39. Fourth, if the Plaintiff's valuations are accepted, these 
businesses will need to be sold now and the parties will not only 
immediately sustain these discounts, they will also suffer 
substantial capital gains taxes. Mr. Barber's tax basis in these 
businesses is currently $250,000 which means a sale could result in 
a tax liability to the parties in a range substantially in excess 
of $100,000, which would further deplete the parties' marital 
assets. In addition, Mr. Barber would lose his job and the ability 
to pay alimony to Plaintiff. By applying the discounts, it brings 
the values into a range where Mr. Barber should be able to keep the 
business interests and pay Mrs. Barber her long-term business buy 
out and also pay her alimony, which is in her best interests. 
40. Finally, by applying the discounts to Mr. Yeanoplos's and 
Mr. Dorton's valuations, all the valuations are brought into 
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relatively close parity which provides the Court with a sense of 
reliability because the more credible appraisers, Mr. Schmidt and 
Mr. Papanikolas, applied the discounts. 
41. Therefore, applying the discounts to the valuations of 
Mr. Yeanoplos and Mr. Dorton would yield the following results: 
YEANOPLOS VALUATION 
Company 
Pont. Olds 
Motor Co. 
Imports 
Auto. Serv. 
Fam. Part. 
Pre-Discount 
Value 
$514,000 
302,000 
183,000 
161,000 
116,000 
Discount 
20% 
30% and 20% 
30% and 20% 
30% and 20% 
30% and 20% 
TOTAL $1,276,000 
Post-
Discount 
Value 
$411,200 
169,120 
102,480 
90,160 
64,960 
$837,920 
DORTON VALUATION 
Company 
Pont. Olds 
Motor Co. 
Imports 
Auto. Serv. 
Fam. Part. 
TOTAL 
Pre-Discount 
Value 
$535,600 
468,400 
83,600 
155,000 
108,700 
$1,351,300 
Discount 
20% 
30% and 20! 
30% and 20; 
30% and 20! 
30% and 20s 
Post-
Discount 
Value 
$428,480 
262,304 
46,816 
86,800 
60,872 
$885,272 
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42. The Court finds that the value of Mr. Barber's business 
interests are most appropriately determined by taking an average of 
the post-discount valuations of the four appraisers (Yeanoplos -
$837,920; Dorton - $885,272; Schmidt - $716,383; and Papanikolas -
$473,700) which equals $728,318. The Court finds that Mrs. Barber 
is entitled to one-half of this amount, or $364,159. 
43. Mr. Barber should immediately pay Mrs. Barber $64,159. 
Mr. Barber shall make said payment by November 1, 1996. Said check 
should be made payable to Mrs. Barber and her attorney Robert L. 
Neeley. 
44. The Court finds the remaining $300,000 should be paid to 
Mrs. Barber less the offset for Mr. Barber's equity in the marital 
home in the amount of $9,000, leaving $291,000. This amount should 
be paid to Mrs. Barber in 34 monthly installments of $2,117.16 
commencing August 1, 1996 through May 1, 1999 and thereafter in 201 
monthly payments in the amount of $2,413.46 commencing June 1, 1999 
through February 1, 2016 when it shall be paid in full. The Court 
finds that the amount owed to Mrs. Barber should bear an annual 
interest rate of 7.5 percent, amortorized monthly, upon which the 
above payment schedule is based. 
45. Mrs. Barber should be granted a lien on Mr. Barber's 
stock in the business interests until such time as the payments 
owed to Mrs. Barber for the business payout are paid in full. 
46. With respect to the alimony issue, the Court finds that 
Mr. Barber has a gross income of $8,025 per month. His taxes are 
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$2,729 per month leaving him with a net income of $5,296 per month. 
If Mr. Barber's monthly child support obligation of $687 is 
subtracted, he has $4,609 per month. If Mr. Barber's monthly 
business payout to Mrs. Barber of $2,117 is deducted, Mr. Barber 
has a disposable income of $2,492 per month through May of 1999, 
after which Mr. Barber will have $2,879 per month because his 
monthly child support obligation of $687 will cease but his 
business payout will increase by $300. 
47. The Court finds that Mr. Barber's reasonable monthly 
expenses are somewhere between $3,200 per month and $3,680 per 
month, leaving him a shortfall of somewhere between $708 and $1,188 
per month for the next three years. 
48. The Court finds that during most of the marriage Mrs. 
Barber was a homemaker and did not work. Mrs. Barber has a high 
school education and one year of college. With the exception of 
one-year when she worked as a substitute teacher, Mrs. Barber did 
not work prior to the parties' separation in 1992. 
49. The Court finds that Mrs. Barber has obtained employment 
as a retail sales clerk for Dillards earning a gross income of 
$1,213 per month less taxes of $218 per month leaving her with a 
net income of $995. Adding the $687 that Mrs. Barber will receive 
in child support, Mrs. Barber will have a net disposable income of 
$1,682. If the business buyout is then added, she will have 
disposable income of $3,799 per month through May of 1999 and 
$3,412 per month thereafter, if Mr. Barber were to pay no alimony. 
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50. For most of the marriage, the entire family's standard of 
living was somewhere around $3,300 per month in disposable income. 
During the marriage the parties also had their personal automobile 
use provided, $50 per month in the personal use of business credit 
cards, the personal use of a cabin owned by Mr. Barber's business 
interests worth approximately $500 annually, the payment of family 
health club dues in the annual amount of $1,100 per year and $1,500 
for the family's portion of business trips taken by Mr. Barber 
which the business paid for. 
51. The Court finds that Mrs. Barber's reasonable monthly 
living expenses for her and Adrian are $3,345. Subtracting $3,345 
from her disposable income of $3,799 per month leaves Mrs. Barber 
with a surplus of $454 per month through June of 1999 and $67 
thereafter, assuming no alimony is awarded. 
52. However, because Mrs. Barber is required to live in part 
on her property distribution from the businesses to meet her needs, 
the Court finds that it is equitable to award Mrs. Barber alimony 
in the amount of $3 0 0 per month through May of 19 99 and $50 0 per 
month thereafter to the extent that the total alimony award does 
not run for a period longer than the period of the parties' 
marriage of 18 years, 5 months. 
53. This alimony award will provide Mrs. Barber with 
surpluses of $754 per month through May of 1999 and $567 per month 
thereafter even assuming her expenses do not drop after Adrian 
turns 18 and graduates from high school. The award will also 
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result in Mr. Barber sustaining a shortfall in his monthly living 
expenses of somewhere between $1,008 and $1,488 per month through 
May of 1999. Mr. Barber's shortage will thereafter be between $821 
and $1,301 per month because his monthly child support obligation 
of $687 will cease but his monthly business payout will increase by 
$300 and his monthly alimony obligation will increase by $200. 
54. The Court finds that both parties will likely receive 
salary increases in the future, but that Mr. Barber will likely 
receive larger future salary increases than Mrs. Barber which 
should work to his benefit in alleviating his monthly shortfall. 
55. As a partial justification for Mrs. Barber having to 
utilize a portion of her business payout to support herself, the 
Court finds Mrs. Barber intentionally delayed obtaining new counsel 
for nearly six months in 1993 and 1994 after Mr. Martin Custen 
withdrew as her attorney. 
56. The Court further finds that after Mr. Neeley was 
obtained as Mrs. Barber's counsel, he intentionally delayed Mr. 
Barber's prior counsel, Judy Barking, in moving this matter forward 
for a period of an additional nine months in 1994 and 1995 because 
he anticipated a brighter outlook for the automobile industry. The 
Court holds Mr. Neeley in high regard ethically and deems his delay 
to be just an act of advocacy. However, the delay clearly inured 
to the benefit of Plaintiff and detriment of Defendant. 
Accordingly, Mrs. Barber should pay for all of the costs associated 
with Mr. Dorton's final valuation. 
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57. If the Court had more fully understood what had occurred 
regarding the delays, the Court may have made the parties rely on 
the prior valuations that had been completed which would have 
valued the businesses lower but allowed for the payment of 
additional alimony. However, the Court believes that it has the 
responsibility to use the most current information available at the 
time of the divorce and, accordingly, has made its decision on that 
basis. 
58. The Court finds that the four Barber brothers all take 
approximately equal salaries. There are slight differences based 
on bonuses and meeting their objectives. Fred Barber's salary is 
higher because he pays for his parents' car and also receives a 
good business bonus. 
59. The Court finds that in setting the salaries in each of 
the Barber Bros, entities, the four Barber brothers have a high 
degree of trust and respect for each other and are not inclined to 
do anything that would be unfair or heavy handed. The business 
relationship between the brothers has worked well because each 
brother has been reluctant to take a hard stand on issues but 
defers to what the majority wanted. Because of this high degree of 
respect, the. Court finds that Mr. Barber cannot do whatever he 
wants, even though he owns a majority interest in the Pontiac-Olds 
dealership. The Court finds that he cannot fix his salary without 
consideration of his brother's feelings and obtaining their 
approval. For Mr. Barber to take out the high salary would cause 
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great disharmony and disruption of the businesses. 
60. The Court finds that Mr. Barber's ability to generate 
income has been diminished. Since his unfortunate airplane crash 
in August of 1995 where he lost one of his eyes, he suffers fatigue 
and can only function three or four hours maximum. Mr. Barber has 
been required to hire people to perform some of the functions that 
he formerly was able to perform. The loss of his eye is going to 
limit Mr. Barber's ability to generate income in the long run which 
also constitutes one of the reasons the court was reluctant to set 
a higher alimony award. 
61. The Court finds that Mr. Barber's parents have 
established an education fund in the amount of $12,000 that Angela 
may use for her college education. The Court further finds that 
the Defendant is a responsible parent that will assist Angela in 
her education so long as Angela is a responsible student. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Plaintiff shall be awarded the sole care, custody and 
control of the parties' minor child, Adrian, born May 29, 1981, 
subject to the Defendant's standard rights of visitation. 
2. Defendant shall pay child support to Plaintiff in the 
amount of $687.00 per month pursuant to the Utah Child Support 
Guidelines. Child support shall be paid on the fifth and twentieth 
days of each month and shall terminate when the child reaches the 
age of eighteen years, or graduates from high school with his 
regular graduating class, whichever occurs later. 
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3. The parties real estate acreage in Roosevelt, Utah shall 
be sold and equally divided between the parties after costs 
associated with selling the property are deducted. A qualified 
realtor shall be engaged to list the property for sale. 
4. Plaintiff shall be awarded the marital home located at 
4685 Porter Ave., South Ogden, Utah. The home has a fair market 
value of $95,000 with a first mortgage balance of $77,000 leaving 
$18,000 equity which shall be divided equally by the parties. The 
Defendant's equity of $9,000 shall be deducted from the Plaintiff's 
share of the Defendant's business interests as outlined below. 
5. Each party shall be awarded the personal property 
currently in their own possession. 
6. Mrs. Barber shall return the automobile that is in her 
possession to the business. Mr. Barber shall not be responsible 
for providing Mrs. Barber with any automobile for her use. 
7. The parties shall each receive one half of the $1,800 
currently held by Defendant in an IRA account. 
8. Mr. Barber shall pay Mrs. Barber $364,159 as payment of 
her half of Mr. Berber's business interests acquired during the 
parties' marriage. 
9. Mr. Barber should immediately pay Mrs. Barber $64,159. 
Mr. Barber shall make said payment by November 1, 1996. Said check 
should be made payable to Mrs. Barber and her attorney Robert L. 
Neeley. 
10. The Court finds the remaining $300,000 should be paid to 
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Mrs. Barber less the offset for Mr. Barber's equity in the marital 
home in the amount of $9,000, leaving $291,000. This amount should 
be paid to Mrs. Barber in 34 monthly installments of $2,117.16 
commencing August 1, 1996 through May 1, 1999 and thereafter in 201 
monthly payments in the amount of $2,413.46 commencing June 1, 1999 
through February 1, 2016 when it shall be paid in full. The Court 
finds that the amount owed to Mrs. Barber should bear an annual 
interest rate of 7.5 percent, amortorized monthly, upon which the 
above payment schedule is based. 
11. Mrs. Barber should be granted a lien on Mr. Barber's 
stock in the business interests until such time as the payments 
owed to Mrs. Barber for the business payout are paid in full. 
12. Mr. Barber shall pay alimony to Mrs. Barber in the amount 
of $3 00 per month through May of 1999 and $500 per month thereafter 
to the extent that the alimony does not last longer than the 
parties' marriage of 18 years, five months. 
13. Mrs. Barber shall pay all the costs associated with Mr. 
Dorton's final evaluation. 
DATED this day of , 1996. 
BY THE COURT: 
Michael D. Lyon 
District Court Judge 
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Approved as to form: 
Robert L. 
Attorney 
Nee 
for 
ey 
Plaintiff 
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Tab 2 
DOUGLAS B. THOMAS (5550) 
Attorneys for Defendant 
GRIDLEY, WARD, HAVAS, SHAW & THOMAS 
635 25th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 621-3317 
Facsimile: (801) 621-3340 
IN THE JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
PATRICIA BARBER, DECREE RE: ALL ISSUES Q $ 3 1 V#& 
RELATING TO DIVORCE 
Plaintiff, : 
v. : 
: Judge: Michael D. Lyon 
SAM JOHN BARBER, JR., : 
: Civil No. 924901656DA 
Defendant. : 
ooOoo 
Trial of the above-entitled matter regarding all issues 
pertaining to the parties' divorce came on regularly before the 
Court on February 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 21 and 28, 1996, before the 
Honorable Michael D. Lyon. Plaintiff was present and represented 
by her attorney, Robert L. Neeley and Defendant was present and 
represented by his attorney Douglas B. Thomas of the law firm of 
Gridley, Ward, Havas, Shaw and Thomas. The Court having heard 
extensive testimony presented by the parties and their experts and 
having carefully reviewed the evidence, memoranda and post-trial 
arguments submitted by the parties and being fully advised in the 
MJCRORU4 sr»L 1 9 8 PAGE 
-zr%'- : : r D : c ~ COURT 
' r. rt - o« C H 10 99 
premises, and the court being fully advised in the matter, and 
having made its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, NOW 
THEREFOR, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Plaintiff shall be awarded the sole care, custody and 
control of the parties' minor child, Adrian, born May 29, 1981, 
subject to the Defendant's standard rights of visitation. 
2. Defendant shall pay child support to Plaintiff in the 
amount of $687.00 per month pursuant to the Utah Child Support 
Guidelines. Child support shall be paid on the fifth and twentieth 
days of each month and shall terminate when the child reaches the 
age of eighteen years, or graduates from high school with his 
regular graduating class, whichever occurs later. 
3. The parties real estate acreage in Roosevelt, Utah shall 
be sold and equally divided between the parties after costs 
associated with selling the property are deducted. A qualified 
realtor shall be engaged to list the property for sale. 
4. Plaintiff shall be awarded the marital home located at 
4685 Porter Ave., South Ogden, Utah. The home has a fair market 
value of $95,000 with a first mortgage balance of $77,000 leaving 
$18,000 equity which shall be divided equally by the parties. The 
Defendant's equity of $9,000 shall be deducted from the Plaintiff's 
share of the Defendant's business interests as outlined below. 
5. Each party shall be awarded the personal property 
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currently in their own possession. 
6. Mrs. Barber shall return the automobile that is in her 
possession to the business. Mr. Barber shall not be responsible 
for providing Mrs. Barber with any automobile for her use. 
7. The parties shall each receive one half of the $-L/0UU 
currently held by Defendant in an IRA account. 
8. Mr. Barber shall pay Mrs. Barber $364,159 as payment of 
her half of Mr. Berber's business interests acquired during the 
parties' marriage. 
9. Mr. Barber shall immediately pay Mrs. Barber $64,159. 
Mr. Barber shall make said payment by November 1, 1996. Said check 
shall be made payable to Mrs. Barber and her attorney Robert L. 
Neeley. 
10. The Court finds the remaining $300,000 shall be paid to 
Mrs. Barber less the offset for Mr. Barber's equity in the marital 
home in the amount of $9,000, leaving $2 91,000. This amount shall 
be paid to Mrs. Barber in 34 monthly installments of $2,117.16 
commencing August 1, 1996 through May 1, 19 99 and thereafter in 2 01 
monthly payments in the amount of $2,413.46 commencing June 1, 1999 
through February 1, 2016 when it shall be paid in full. The Court 
finds that the amount owed to Mrs. Barber shall bear an annual 
interest rate of 7.5 percent, amortorized monthly, upon which the 
above payment schedule is based. 
11. Mrs. Barber shall be granted a lien on Mr. Barber's stock 
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in the business interests until such time as the payments owed to 
Mrs. Barber for the business payout are paid in full. 
12. Mr. Barber shall pay alimony to Mrs. Barber in the amount 
of $300 per month through May of 1999 and $500 per month thereafter 
to the extent that the alimony does not last longer than the 
parties' marriage of 18 years, five months. 
13. Mrs. Barber shall pay all the costs associated with Mr. 
Dorton's final evaluation. 
6-/ day of \LJO 1! DATED this .996. 
BY THE COURT: 
el D. Lyon r^ Micha  
District Court Judg^ 
Approved as to form: 
Robert L. Nee 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
*iAn i 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
***** 
PATRICIA BARBER, 
PLAINTIFF, 
VS. 
SAM JOHN BARBER, JR., 
DEFENDANT. 
\m 17 m 
COURT RULING 
CASE NO. 924901656 
***** 
BE IT REMEMBERED THAT THIS MATTER CAME ON REGULARLY FOR 
HEARING BEFORE"THE HONORABLE MICHAEL D. LYON, JUDGE, SITTING 
AT OGDEN, UTAH ON THE 10TH DAY OF JUNE 1996. 
WHEREUPON THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD, TO WIT: 
***** 
APPEARANCES: 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: 
ROBERT L. NEELEY 
DOUGLAS B. THOMAS 
***** 
REPORTED BY DEAN OLSEN, CSR 
847 E. 2800 N. 
NORTH OGDEN, UTAH 84414 
OFS. 399-8405, HM. 782-3146 
.33 
1 OGDEN, UTAH JUNE 10. 1996 8:00 A.M. 
2 IN CHAMBERS 
3 THE COURT: GOOD MORNING, COUNSEL. LET ME PUT YOU 
4 ON THE SPEAKER PHONE SO THAT EVERYBODY CAN HEAR. CAN YOU HEAR 
5 OKAY? 
6 MR. THOMAS: YES. 
7 MR. NEELEY: YES. 
8II THE COURT: THE RECORD MAY SHOW THAT THIS IS THE 
9 TIME SET FOR DECISION IN THE MATTER OF PATRICIA BARBER VERSUS 
10 SAM JOHN BARBER, JUNIOR, DEFENDANT. RECORD MAY FURTHER SHOW 
11 THAT THE COURT"REPORTER IS IN CHAMBERS AND THE LAWYERS ARE ON 
12 THE SPEAKER PHONE SO THAT EVERYBODY CAN HEAR. 
13 THIS IS THE TIME FOR AN ORAL DECISION. LET ME JUST 
14 INDICATE THAT IN THE INTEREST OF TIME, BECAUSE I KNOW MR. 
15 NEELEY NEEDS TO BE IN ANOTHER COURT LATER THIS MORNING, AND I 
16 HAVE SOME TELEPHONE CONFERENCES AT 8:30 AND 8:45, I'M GOING TO 
17 GET RIGHT TO THE HEART OF THE PIVOTAL ISSUES. MR. THOMAS, I'M 
18 GOING TO ASK THAT YOU PREPARE THE COURT'S FINDINGS, 
19 CONCLUSIONS, AND JUDGMENT. 
20 MR. THOMAS: OKAY. 
21 THE COURT: WITH TIME PERMITTING AT THE END I'M 
22 GOING TO GIVE YOU SOME GENERAL FINDINGS THAT I THINK ARE PART 
23 AND PARCEL OF THIS CASE AND PERHAPS UNDERGIRD SOME OF THE 
24 PREMISES THAT THE COURT HAS MADE IN ITS DECISION. TO THE 
25 EXTENT THAT I DON'T DO THAT, YOU HAVE PERMISSION TO AUGMENT 
II 
1 THE COURT'S FINDINGS TO MAKE IT CONSISTENT AND SUPPORT THE 
2 COURT'S PIVOTAL FINDINGS AND RULINGS THIS MORNING. FOR 
3 EXAMPLE, I WOULD LIKE YOU TO GO THROUGH AND TALK ABOUT THE 
4 LENGTH OF THE MARRIAGE AND THE AGE OF THE PARTIES AND THEIR 
5 EDUCATION AND THEIR EMPLOYMENT AND TALK ABOUT THEIR LIFE STYLE 
6 IN TERMS OF THEIR USE OF THE AUTOMOBILE AND THE BOAT AND THE 
7 CABIN AND THEIR VACATIONS AND THAT, YOU KNOW, MR. BARBER'S 
8 INTEREST IN THE CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS, I'M NOT GOING TO 
9 GET INTO ALL OF THAT THIS MORNING, BUT I WOULD LIKE YOU TO 
10 AUGMENT THE COURT'S FINDINGS SO THAT THEY START OUT SO THAT 
11 ANYONE REVIEWING THESE, IF THAT BECOMES NECESSARY, HAS HAD A 
12 COMPLETE PICTURE OF THIS CASE. AND THAT MAY TAKE SOME TIME 
13 AND CARE ON YOUR PART, BUT I THINK -- AND THEN I WOULD 
14 REQUEST, THOUGH, THAT YOU DO THAT IN CONSULTATION WITH 
15 MR. NEELEY. GIVE HIM, BEFORE YOU SUBMIT THOSE FOR REVIEW OR 
16 FOR SIGNATURE, THAT YOU PERHAPS SEND HIM A DRAFT SO THAT HE 
17 HAS SOME INPUT ON THE PREPARATION OF THOSE AS WELL. IN OTHER 
18 WORDS, I'M ASKING YOU TO PREPARE THEM, BUT I'M ALSO ASKING 
19 MR. NEELEY TO BE INVOLVED IN PREPARING THOSE AS WELL. 
20 MR. THOMAS: CERTAINLY. 
21 THE COURT: OKAY. WITH THAT INTRODUCTION, LET ME 
22 JUST INDICATE THAT THE COURT FINDS AND RULES AS FOLLOWS: THAT 
23 MR. BARBER'S BASIC ANNUAL SALARY OF IN TERMS OF INCOME THAT HE 
24 TAKES OUT OF THE BUSINESS IS APPROXIMATELY $86,000 PER YEAR. 
25 IN ADDITION, HE HAS A PERSONAL AUTOMOBILE USE AND FOR NOT ONLY 
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HIMSELF, BUT FOR ANGELA, AND SOME GAS AND REPAIRS, AND ALSO 
FOR HER. HE ALSO ENJOYS SOME PERKS OUT OF THE BUSINESS. USE 
OF CREDIT CARDS, THE CABIN UP IN ISLAND PARK, HEALTH CLUB 
DUES, SO FORTH. ALL COMBINED, THAT IS HIS BASIC SALARY PLUS 
HIS AUTOMOBILE USE^AND PERK, I FIND HIS ANNUAL SALARY IS 
$96,300 PER YEAR, WHICH COMPUTES TO $8,025 PER MONTH. 
NOW, I FOUND THAT I WAS IN ACCORD WITH MR. BARBER IN HIS 
OBSERVATIONS THAT HE MADE AT THE END OF THE TRIAL, WHICH YOU 
HAVE ADDRESSED MR. THOMAS IN YOUR ARGUMENT, ABOUT ADDING THE 
CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS TO HIS SALARY, AND THEN ALSO ADDING 
THEM TO THE INCOME STREAM OF THE BUSINESS. I FEEL THAT IS 
INEQUITABLE. I THINK THAT IT AMOUNTS TO A DOUBLE CHARGE. AND 
INASMUCH AS EACH APPRAISER HAS ALREADY INCLUDED THOSE 
CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS INTO THE EQUITY OF THE BUSINESS, AND 
IN SOME INSTANCES USED A MULTIPLIER OF 1.25 OR TO 4.5, I 
CHOOSE NOT TO IMPUTE ANY OF THOSE CHARITABLE CONTRIBUTIONS TO 
HIS INCOME. IN OTHER WORDS, THEY'RE JUST IN THE BUSINESS. TO 
DO OTHERWISE, IT SEEMS TO ME THAT I'D TO HAVE GO BACK AND TRY 
AND UNRAVEL EVERYTHING THAT'S BEEN DONE. AND I'M JUST NOT 
GOING TO DO THAT. WHEN I SAY UNRAVEL, I'M TALKING ABOUT I'M 
TRYING TO UNRAVEL THE APPRAISALS. 
BASED ON HIS $96,300 A YEAR SALARY, WHICH COMPUTES TO 
$8,025 PER MONTH, I FIND THAT HE HAS A NET INCOME OF $5,296. 
I HAVE BACKED OUT $2,729 FOR TAXES AT THE RATE OF ABOUT 34 
PERCENT. I THEREFORE FIND THAT MRS. BARBER'S GROSS INCOME IS 
1 1,213 PER MONTH, MR. BARBER'S IS 8,025, FOR A COMBINED MONTHLY 
2 ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME OF $9,238. APPLYING THE CHILD SUPPORT 
3 SCHEDULE -- AND I WILL TELL YOU THAT I DID THIS AT HOME THIS 
4 WEEKEND, THIS DECISION, AND MY CODE AT HOME WAS NOT AS 
5 CURRENT. IT WAS A '94 EDITION. I'M TRUSTING THAT THE CHILD 
6 SUPPORT SCHEDULE HAS NOT CHANGED IN THE LAST COUPLE EVER 
7 YEARS. IF IT HAS, YOU'RE JUST GOING TO HAVE TO REDO THIS. 
8 BUT APPLYING THE SCHEDULE THAT I HAD, THE MOST CURRENT ONE 
9 THAT I HAD, I FIND THAT THE SUPPORT FOR ANGELA, THAT'S ALL 
10 THAT IS AT ISSUE RIGHT NOW --OR NOT ANGELA, BUT FOR --
11 MR. NEELEY: ADRIAN. 
12 THE COURT: $790 PER MONTH BASED ON THEIR INCOMES. 
13 I FIND THAT HE HAS 87 PERCENT OF THEIR COMBINED MONTHLY 
14 ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME AND, THEREFORE, WILL PAY CHILD SUPPORT 
15 IN THE SUM OF $687 PER MONTH. AND SHE, 103. 
16 IN TERMS OF A DIVISION OF THE PROPERTY, I FIND THAT THE 
17 PARTIES HAVE ACREAGE IN ROOSEVELT THAT SHOULD BE SOLD AND 
18 EQUALLY DIVIDED. I'M GOING TO ORDER THAT A QUALIFIED REALTOR 
19 BE ENGAGED TO LIST THE PROPERTY AND SELL IT AND THAT THE 
20 PARTIES WILL ENJOY THE PROCEEDS AFTER THEY HAVE DIVIDED 
21 EQUALLY THE COSTS OF SELLING. 
22 I WILL AWARD TO THE PLAINTIFF THE HOME AT 4685 PORTER. I 
23 FIND THAT IT HAS A FAIR MARKET VALUE OF $95,000 WITH A 
24 MORTGAGE OF APPROXIMATELY 77,000, WHICH LEAVES $18,000 EQUITY. 
25 I'LL GIVE EACH OF THE PARTIES HALF OF THAT. 
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YOU'RE GOING TO FIND THAT MY DECISION IS SOMEWHAT BROAD 
STROKED AND I'M GOING TO LEAVE SOME OF THIS UP TO YOU TO 
DECIDE HOW YOU WANT TO DO THIS. I WOULD PROBABLY SUGGEST THAT 
WE REDUCE THE PLAINTIFF'S INTEREST IN THE BARBER BROTHERS 
STOCK BY $9,000. THAT IS JUST CUTTING THAT $18,000 IN HALF. 
BUT I'LL LEAVE THAT UP TO THE SOUND DISCRETION OF BOTH OF YOU 
AS YOU SORT OUT MY DECISION. 
I'M AWARDING TO EACH PARTY THE PERSONAL PROPERTY THAT IS 
IN HIS OR HER POSSESSION. I'M ORDERING THAT MRS. BARBER 
RETURN THE AUTOMOBILE THAT IS IN HER POSSESSION TO THE 
BUSINESS. 
THERE IS AN $1,800 IRA THAT CAN BE DIVIDED 900 EACH OR IT 
CAN BE AWARDED TO DEFENDANT AND REDUCE HIS EQUITY IN THE HOME 
IN SOME FASHION IF YOU WANT TO DO THAT. IN OTHER WORDS, I 
JUST DIDN'T GET DOWN AND FINE TUNE THIS. I JUST FRANKLY RAN 
OUT OF TIME. I SPENT A LOT OF TIME JUST TRYING TO UNDERSTAND 
ALL THESE APPRAISALS AND THINGS AND IN THE END I KIND OF GOT 
CAUGHT SHORT IN TERMS OF JUST FINE TUNING THIS DECISION, BUT I 
HAVE CONFIDENCE IN BOTH OF YOU THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO SORT 
THIS OUT. 
LET ME GIVE YOU SOME GENERAL SWEEPING GENERALIZATIONS 
ABOUT THESE EVALUATIONS THAT WERE DONE. OBVIOUSLY, THE 
EXPERTISE AND SKILL OF THESE APPRAISERS EXCEEDS ALL OF OUR 
UNDERSTANDING; AT LEAST I'LL CONFESS IT EXCEEDS MINE. I HAVE 
SPENT TIME GOING THROUGH THEM TRYING TO UNDERSTAND THEM, AND I 
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FEEL TO SOME EXTENT THAT I UNDERSTAND THEM REASONABLY WELL. 
AND YOUR BRIEFS WERE HELPFUL AND AS I USED MY TRIAL NOTES AND 
IN LOOKING AT THE EXHIBITS AND TRYING TO MAKE SOME ASSESSMENT 
OF RELIABILITY AND CREDIBILITY ON A NUMBER OF ISSUES. 
OBVIOUSLY, THESE APPRAISALS OR EVALUATIONS INVOLVE CRITICAL 
JUNCTURES AND A CERTAIN EXERCISE OF DISCRETION BY THE 
EVALUATOR. IN OTHER WORDS, NONE OF THIS IS A PRECISE SCIENCE. 
THERE ARE CERTAIN KNOWN PRINCIPLES THAT SOME OF THEM HAVE 
APPLIED. BUT AS I WENT THROUGH THEM, I FOUND MYSELF BEING 
SOMEWHAT CRITICAL OF PLAINTIFF'S EVALUATIONS, AND DID SO 
PRIMARILY FOR A COUPLE OF REASONS: ONE, I FELT THAT IN NO WAY 
DID THEY EVER FACTOR IN PROJECT 2000. AND THE COURT FINDS 
THAT THOSE ISSUES THAT WERE RAISED BY MR. BARBER ARE REAL. 
AND I ALSO FELT THAT THEY NEVER TO MY COMFORT LEVEL ADEQUATELY 
ADDRESSED THE CYCLICAL NATURE OF THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY. 
I THINK TOO MUCH WEIGHT WAS PUT ON 1994, WHICH I THINK WAS AN 
UNUSUAL YEAR, AND TO SOME EXTENT THE SAME ON 1995. AND I 
RESPECT THE FACT THAT THE UTAH ECONOMY IS RIGHT NOW ROBUST. 
BUT ALL WE HAVE TO DO IS JUST LOOK BACK IN PREVIOUS YEARS AND 
SEE WHEN IT WASN'T THAT BAD EITHER, AND I'M THINKING IN 1992 
AND 1993. YOU KNOW, THESE BUSINESSES ACCORDING TO MR. 
DORTON'S FIRST COUPLE OF APPRAISALS, THESE BUSINESS'S STOCK 
INTERESTS WERE NOT THAT MUCH. AND I FOUND MYSELF AT TIMES 
FINDING HIGH CREDIBILITY IN WHAT MR. DORTON DID IN HIS 
EVALUATION, AND YET I WAS DISTURBED BY ONE OR TWO YEARS JUST 
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DRAMATICALLY INCREASING THE VALUE OF THAT STOCK. AND FRANKLY, 
IT STRAINED CREDIBILITY A LITTLE BIT. 
ON THE OTHER HAND, I FOUND MR. SCHMIDT HIGHLY CREDIBLE. 
FROM A PRACTICAL STANDPOINT, I WAS IMPRESSED WITH HIS VAST 
YEARS OF EXPERIENCE, ESPECIALLY IN EVALUATING AUTOMOBILE 
BUSINESSES. I THINK TO BE SURE, HE WASN'T AS ERUDITE AS, SAY, 
MR. YEANOPLOS OR MR. DORTON. YET I LOOKED AT THE FACT THAT HE 
HAD EVALUATED OVER A HUNDRED AUTOMOTIVE DEALERSHIPS, AND I 
THINK THAT HE HAD A LOT OF PRACTICAL HANDS-ON INSIGHT AND 
EXPERIENCE. I THINK HE HAD A GOOD PULSE OF THINGS. AND I WAS 
IMPRESSED THAT HE WAS NOT DECIDING THIS CASE IN A VACUUM. 
RATHER, HE LOOKED AT THE MARKETPLACE. HE EVEN LOOKED AT THE 
LINES OF CARS AND THINGS AND WHAT SELLS AND WHAT DOESN'T SELL. 
AND I FOUND THAT VERY IMPORTANT. I MEAN WE LOOK AT, AS I'M 
RECALLING THE EVIDENCE, YOU LOOK AT THE OLDSMOBILE LINE. I 
THINK LAST YEAR, I THINK EVIDENCE WAS, THAT IN AMERICA THEY 
ONLY SOLD 3 00,000 OF THOSE CARS WHERE THE YEAR BEFORE THEY 
SOLD A MILLION, AS I'M RECALLING THE EVIDENCE. YOU KNOW, IN 
OTHER WORDS, HE WAS ATTUNED TO THOSE KIND OF ISSUES, WHERE I 
THINK MR. DORTON AND MR. YEANOPLOS, ALTHOUGH VERY WELL 
EDUCATED AND USED SOME VERY SOPHISTICATED PRINCIPLES, DIDN'T 
SEEM TO BE AS ATTUNED TO THOSE KIND OF PRACTICAL THINGS. 
I THINK THAT THERE'S EVIDENCE THAT THE RULE OF THUMB 
METHOD THAT MR. SCHMIDT EMPLOYED SHOULD NOT BE USED BY ITSELF, 
AND HE DID NOT DO THAT. I THINK THE EVIDENCE WAS THAT IT'S --
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ALTHOUGH THAT WAS THE BASIS OF HIS, MR. SCHMIDT'S EVALUATION, 
THE EVIDENCE WOULD INDICATE THAT THAT OUGHT TO BE USED FOR 
INSIGHT ONLY. I'M NOT SO SURE THAT I'D GO QUITE THAT FAR 
BECAUSE I FRANKLY THINK THE WAY HE WENT ABOUT APPRAISING THE 
BUSINESS MADE A LOT OF SENSE, BUT I WILL ALSO SAY THAT WHEN I 
GOT DOWN TO EVALUATING THE BUSINESSES, I FOUND THAT HIS 
APPRAISAL WAS VERY INSIGHTFUL. AND IN FACT, PROVIDED A LOT OF 
VALIDATION FOR THE COURT'S ASSESSMENT OF THE TRUE VALUE OF 
THIS BUSINESS. AND I'LL EXPLAIN WHAT I'M TALKING ABOUT IN A 
MINUTE. 
I LIKED MR. YEANOPLOS AND I LIKED MR. DORTON, BUT I ALSO 
WAS CONSCIOUS THAT MR. YEANOPLOS HAS HAD NO EXPERIENCE EVER 
EVALUATING A DEALERSHIP. AND VERY FRANKLY, VERY LITTLE 
IN-DEPTH EXPERIENCE EVALUATING OTHER BUSINESSES. I FOUND THAT 
WHAT HE DID WAS ON THE SUPERFICIAL LEVEL, AND GIVING OPINIONS 
OVER THE PHONE, AND HIS APPROACH I THINK ON A LOT OF THINGS 
WAS VERY THEORETICAL AND LOST SOME OF THE PRACTICAL TOUCH THAT 
I FOUND IN MR. SCHMIDT'S EVALUATION. FOR EXAMPLE, I FOUND 
THAT HIS CAPITALIZATION OF EXCESS EARNINGS IN COMING UP WITH 
HIS EVALUATION OF MR. BARBER'S INTERESTS OF $1.9 MILLION NOT 
CREDIBLE. IT WAS SO FAR OUT ON THE EXTREME THAT I HAD NO 
CONFIDENCE IN IT. AND IN MY EVALUATION OF THE BUSINESS, I 
CHOSE TO DISREGARD THAT METHOD OF EVALUATING THE BUSINESS 
ENTIRELY. IN OTHER WORDS, I JUST DISREGARDED IT ENTIRELY. 
AS I SAID, I FIND THAT THAT METHOD WAS EXTREME AND I 
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DECLINED TO USE IT. I DID USE HIS CAPITALIZATION OF EARNINGS 
METHOD, HOWEVER. AND I FOUND THAT MORE CREDIBLE AND IN THE 
BALL PARK WITH THE OTHER EXPERTS, ALTHOUGH IT ALSO FAILED TO 
CONSIDER THE ASSETS OF THE BUSINESS. 
IF TIME WERE PERMITTING -- AND THERE ISN'T TIME -- I'D BE 
MORE SPECIFIC ABOUT EACH OF THESE APPRAISERS AND THE CONCERNS 
THAT I HAD. BUT AS I WENT THROUGH MY NOTES AND LOOKED AT THE 
CLOSING ARGUMENTS, I FOUND THAT I WAS -- CONSISTENTLY I FOUND 
MYSELF IN AGREEMENT WITH THE OBSERVATIONS AND ARGUMENTS AND 
COMMENTS OF MR. THOMAS AND, THEREFORE, TO THE EXTENT THAT IT'S 
APPROPRIATE IN YOUR FINDINGS, MR. THOMAS, YOU MAY MAKE YOUR 
OBSERVATIONS ON THE FINDINGS IN TERMS OF SUPPORTING THE 
COURT'S DECISION AS I'M NOW INDICATING IT TO YOU. 
ONE WITH OF THE THINGS THAT I WAS CONCERNED WITH IS THAT 
CERTAINLY IT MAY HAVE BEEN WITH MR. DORTON, BUT CERTAINLY WITH 
MR. YEANOPLOS'S APPRAISAL, IT WAS PREDICATED ON THE DEFENDANT 
KEEPING HIS INTEREST IN THE BUSINESS AND APPLYING HIS SKILL, 
TRAINING, AND TALENTS. AND YET LOOKING AT THE VALUATIONS THAT 
HE GAVE THE BUSINESS, I MEAN JUST EVEN USING THE 
CAPITALIZATION OF EARNINGS RATE, WHICH WOULD GIVE A VALUE OF A 
1,276,000, AND IF WE WERE TO USE THE OTHER METHOD, WHICH I 
CHOSE TO ENTIRELY DISREGARD, OF 1.9, I MEAN THERE'S NO WAY 
THAT HE COULD EVER AFFORD TO KEEP THAT BUSINESS. AND, 
THEREFORE, TO PREMISE YOUR EVALUATION THAT HE'S GOING TO STAY 
IN THE BUSINESS AND APPLY HIS SKILL AND TRAINING AND TALENTS 
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JUST WASN'T REALISTIC. AND EVEN BY AVERAGING THEM AS HE DID 
IN COMING UP WITH ROUGHLY AROUND 1.6 WAS NOT REALISTIC. 
CONCERNING MR. PAPANIKOLAS'S EVALUATION, I STRUGGLED WITH 
THIS ONE AT THE TIME OF TRIAL AND DID SO WHILE I WAS MAKING MY 
DECISION. YOU KNOW, I WAS CONCERNED ABOUT HIS OBJECTIVITY 
BECAUSE OF HIS LONGSTANDING RELATIONSHIP WITH THE DEFENDANT 
AND HIS BUSINESS. AND BECAUSE OF HIS AND HIS SISTER'S 
FINANCIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE COMPANY. AND AT THE TIME THAT 
I ALLOWED THE TESTIMONY IN, I HAD SOME MISGIVINGS ABOUT 
WHETHER HE SHOULD BE DISQUALIFIED. AND I KNOW, MR. NEELEY, 
YOU SUBMITTED SOME -- I DON'T HAVE THAT RIGHT IN FRONT OF ME, 
BUT IT WAS A DOCUMENT THAT WOULD SUGGEST THAT HE OUGHT NOT TO 
BE OR IT'S NOT APPROPRIATE FOR HIM TO TESTIFY BECAUSE HE IS 
NOT INDEPENDENT. I CHOSE IN THIS CASE AT THE TIME AND DID SO 
ON THE BASIS THAT I DID AT TRIAL, THAT -- THAT I WOULD LET 
THAT TESTIMONY IN ON THE BASIS THAT HIS OSTENSIBLE LACK OF 
OBJECTIVITY WOULD GO TO THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. AND THAT 
WAS THE BASIS THAT I ALLOWED IT IN AT THE TIME OF TRIAL. BUT 
IN CANDOR, AS I LISTENED TO HIS TESTIMONY, I FOUND HIS 
TESTIMONY CREDIBLE AND HELPFUL. 
NOW, OBVIOUSLY, HE IS QUITE A WAYS BELOW EVEN THE OTHER 
THREE APPRAISERS, BUT I NONETHELESS FOUND MYSELF FINDING HIM 
CREDIBLE. AND ANOTHER WAY OF LOOKING AT IT, AND I THINK HIS, 
FOR EXAMPLE, HIS MINORITY AND MARKETABILITY DISCOUNTS TO BE 
CONSERVATIVE, ON THE REASONABLE SIDE. SO I DID IN THE END 
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DECIDE THAT I WOULD USE HIS EVALUATION JUST TO PROVIDE SOME 
PERSPECTIVE TO THE DECISION. 
LET ME INDICATE THAT IN GOING THROUGH THE APPRAISALS, I 
FIND THAT MR. YEANOPLOS'S APPRAISAL USING THE CAPITALIZATION 
OF EARNINGS RATE TO BE $1,276,000. I FOUND MR. DORTON'S 
APPRAISAL TO BE $1,351,300. 
NOW, IF I WERE TO LOOK AT THE EVIDENCE MOST FAVORABLY 
FROM THE PLAINTIFF, WHAT THEY WERE ASKING ME TO DO, WE WOULD 
HAVE MR. BARBER'S INTERESTS BETWEEN 1.2 AND 1.3 MILLION 
DOLLARS. CERTAINLY, THERE IS NO WAY THAT MR. DORTON -- EXCUSE 
HE ME, MR. BARBER CAN BUY OUT OVER 20 YEARS MRS. BARBER'S 
INTEREST WITHOUT FURTHER UNDERCAPITALIZING THE BUSINESS. IN 
OTHER WORDS, HE'D JUST BE RAIDING THE BUSINESS TO TRY TO MEET 
THE OBLIGATION, AND THE BUSINESS THEMSELVES RIGHT NOW ARE 
UNDERCAPITALIZED, AND IT WOULD ONLY COMPOUND THAT PROBLEM. 
EVEN BY TAKING MR. SCHMIDT'S EVALUATION AND ADDING IT -- AND 
MR. PAPANIKOLAS WHICH, YOU KNOW, HIS INTEREST OR HIS VALUATION 
WAS $473,700, IF I TAKE MR. SCHMIDT'S AND MR. PAPANIKOLAS*S 
EVALUATIONS AND JUST AVERAGED THOSE IN, WE STILL HAVE $966,638 
BEING THE VALUE OF THE BUSINESS. AND MR. BARBER WAS EMPHATIC 
THAT IF THE COURT WERE TO FIND HIS INTERESTS WERE MORE THAN 
$900,000, HE WANTED THE COURT JUST TO ORDER THE BUSINESS TO BE 
SOLD. AND I THINK HE WAS RIGHT. I THINK, FRANKLY, I THINK 
IT'S GOING TO PUSH HIM TO DO IT IN ANYWAY, EVEN THE WAY THAT 
THE COURT HAS FINALLY STRUCTURED THIS. BUT I THINK THAT 
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1 CERTAINLY ANYTHING OVER $900,000 IS JUST OUT OF THE REALM OF 
2 REALISM. 
3 FOR EXAMPLE, IF I WERE TO JUST TAKE AN AVERAGE OF ALL 
4 FOUR APPRAISERS SO THAT WE USED THE FIGURE OF $966,638, AND 
5 AMORTIZE THAT OVER-20 YEARS AT 7.5 PERCENT INTEREST, WHICH THE 
6 PARTIES SEEM TO SUGGEST WOULD BE APPROPRIATE, THAT'S A PAYMENT 
7 EVERY MONTH TO MRS. BARBER OF $3,746. WELL, BASED ON HIS 
8 INCOME, THAT LEAVES HIM $900 TO LIVE ON BY THE TIME HE PAYS 
9 HIS CHILD SUPPORT. AND, YOU KNOW, OBVIOUSLY THAT'S NOT 
10 REALISTIC. SO I THINK THAT MR. BARBER'S APPROACH TO JUST 
11 SAYING IF IT IS OVER $900,000, SELL THE BUSINESS, I THINK WAS 
12 REALISTIC. AND I DON'T THINK THAT ACCOMPLISHES ANYTHING 
13 BECAUSE IF THE BUSINESS IS SOLD, THEN BOTH PARTIES ARE GOING 
14 TO LOSE EVEN FURTHER BECAUSE -- I BELIEVE THAT I HAVE THIS 
15 SOMEPLACE IN MY NOTES, BUT I COULDN'T FIND IT, BUT I BELIEVE 
16 THE BASE IN THE BUSINESS IS SOMEWHERE AROUND 200,000 OR 
17 $250,000. AND ON ALMOST A MILLION DOLLARS, YOU CAN IMAGINE 
18 THE ENORMOUS CAPITAL GAINS THAT THESE PARTIES ARE GOING TO 
19 PAY. CAPITAL GAINS TAX. AND SO WHAT I BELIEVE IS THE 
20 APPROPRIATE APPROACH IS TO APPLY A MARKETABILITY DISCOUNT AND 
21 MINORITY DISCOUNT TO THESE BUSINESS ENTITIES. 
22 NOW, THERE IS NO MINORITY DISCOUNT TO THE 
23 PONTIAC-OLDSMOBILE DEALERSHIP BECAUSE HE HAS A MAJORITY 
24 INTEREST THERE, BUT I DID APPLY A MARKETABILITY DISCOUNT TO 
25 THAT ENTITY. AND I APPLIED BOTH DISCOUNTS TO ALL ANOTHER 
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ENTITIES. AND I'M DOING THAT BECAUSE THE BUSINESS WILL --IF 
WE DON'T, THE BUSINESS HAS GOT TO BE SOLD ANYWAY. AND SINCE 
THEY'VE GOT TO BE SOLD, THOSE DISCOUNTS, AS FAR AS THE COURT'S 
CONCERNED, WILL BECOME A REALITY. AND I AGREE WITH THE POLICY 
ENUNCIATED IN MR. SCHMIDT'S EVALUATIONS. I BELIEVE HE'S 
CORRECT AND APPROPRIATE. I DIDN'T AGREE WITH THE CONCLUSIONS 
OF MR. YEANOPLOS OR MR. DORTON. I BELIEVE THAT THE AMOUNTS 
ARE FAIR AND REASONABLE. THAT IS A 20 PERCENT MARKETABILITY 
DISCOUNT AND A 30 PERCENT MINORITY DISCOUNT. AND I BELIEVE 
THAT THOSE -- THE COURT IS COMFORTABLE WITH THE DISCOUNTS AND 
THE AMOUNTS BASED ON THE TREATISE VALUING SMALL BUSINESSES AND 
PROFESSIONAL PRACTICES BY SHANNON PRATT, PLANNING AND TAXATION 
GUIDE. 
SO IN SUMMARY AT THIS POINT, I THINK NOT ONLY DO THESE 
DISCOUNTS -- NOT ONLY WILL THEY ULTIMATELY BE APPLIED ANYWAY, 
BUT I BELIEVE THAT THIS HELPS THE PARTIES AVOID SUFFERING A 
SUBSTANTIAL CAPITAL GAINS TAX LIABILITY. I ALSO FOUND THAT 
WHEN I DID THAT, IT BROUGHT ALL THE APPRAISALS IN CLOSE PARITY 
AND, THEREFORE, IN MY MIND, GAVE ME A SENSE OF RELIABILITY 
BECAUSE BOTH OF THE OTHER APPRAISERS, MR. SCHMIDT AND MR. 
PAPANIKOLAS HAD APPLIED THOSE DISCOUNTS. 
NOW, MR. PAPANIKOLAS APPLIED SOME VARIATION OF THOSE 
DISCOUNTS. THEY WEREN'T EXACTLY THE SAME ONES, BUT THEY WERE 
REASONABLE, AND SO I DIDN'T DISTURB HIS. AND BY APPLYING 
THOSE DISCOUNTS, IT NOW BRINGS THE BUSINESS WITHIN A RANGE 
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1 THAT MR. BARBER CAN BUY OUT HIS WIFE'S INTEREST AND PLUS 
2 PRESERVE THE EXPECTATION THAT THERE WOULD BE A LONG TERM 
3 BUY-OUT, WHICH I THINK IS IN HER INTEREST. AND I BELIEVE THAT 
4 IT IS IN HIS INTERESTS AND IT AVOIDS THE TAX LIABILITY THAT 
5 I'VE DISCUSSED. 
6 NOW, IN DOING THAT, LET ME TELL YOU WHAT I HAVE DONE. 
7 AND YOU CAN CHECK MY MATH ON THIS IF WOULD YOU LIKE. ON ONE 
8 COLUMN ON THE LEFT-HAND SIDE I GOT PONTIAC-OLDSMOBILE AND THEN 
9 51.5 PERCENT. AND UNDERNEATH THAT I'VE GOT MOTOR COMPANY, 3 9 
10 PERCENT. UNDER THAT IMPORTS, 44 PERCENT. UNDER THAT, 
11 AUTOMOTIVE SERVICES, 25 PERCENT. AND UNDER THAT, FAMILY 
12 PARTNERSHIP OF 25 PERCENT. SO THAT'S THE FAR LEFT COLUMN. 
13 THEN RIGHT NEXT TO IT I HAVE MR. YEANOPLOS'S APPRAISAL. 
14 AND APPLYING THE DISCOUNTS, I -- AND AGAIN, I DIDN'T APPLY IT 
15 ON THE PONTIAC-OLDSMOBILE OR THE DISCOUNT ON ANY OF THOSE. 
16 AND NEITHER DID MR. SCHMIDT OR MR. PAPANIKOLAS. LET ME JUST 
17 GIVE YOU THE FIGURES. AND WHAT I DID IS APPLIED THE 20 
18 PERCENT MARKETABILITY DISCOUNT AND 3 0 PERCENT MINORITY 
19 DISCOUNT FOR EACH OF THOSE ENTITIES. UNDER MR. YEANOPLOS I 
20 HAVE $411,200. FOR MOTOR COMPANY, 164,120. FOR IMPORTS, 
21 $102,480. AUTOMOTIVE SERVICES, 90,160. THE FAMILY 
22 PARTNERSHIP, 64,960. FOR A TOTAL VALUATION OF $832,920. 
23 FOR MR. DORTON I DID THE SAME APPROACH, AND HERE ARE HIS 
24 FIGURES: FOR PONTIAC-OLDS, $430,880. MOTOR COMPANY, 
25 $262,304. IMPORTS, 46,480. AUTOMOTIVE SERVICES, 86,800. AND 
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FAMILY PARTNERSHIP, 60,872. FOR A TOTAL VALUATION OF 
$887,336. 
I APPLIED MR. SCHMIDT'S EVALUATION ON THE THREE ENTITIES 
THAT HE APPRAISED. AND AGAIN, THOSE ARE 335,589 ON THE 
PONTIAC-OLDS, 217,697 ON THE MOTOR COMPANY. ON THE IMPORTS, 
$21,294. NOW, HE DID NOT APPRISE THE AUTOMOTIVE SERVICES, THE 
FAMILY PARTNERSHIP, AND I STRUGGLED ON HOW TO DO THAT SO I 
COULD MAKE, YOU KNOW, COMPARE APPLES WITH APPLES, TO USE A 
CLICHE. AND WHAT I DID IS THAT I -- MR. PAPANIKOLAS HAD 
APPRAISED THOSE, THAT ENTITY, AND SO WHAT I DID IS I TOOK MR. 
YEANOPLOS'S, MR. DORTON'S, AND MR. PAPANIKOLAS'S EVALUATIONS 
AND I AVERAGED THOSE, AND THEN IMPUTED THAT AVERAGE TO MR. 
SCHMIDT SO THAT THERE WOULD BE SOMETHING TO WORK INTO THE 
EQUATION. AND THEN FOR THE FAMILY PARTNERSHIP, I FOUND THAT 
ONLY MR. YEANOPLOS AND MR. DORTON HAD EVALUATED THOSE. 
NOW, MR. PAPANIKOLAS HAD COMBINED THAT WITH THE IMPORTS, 
BUT BECAUSE HE HAD NOT SEPARATED IT OUT, I PUT THE $25,800 IN 
JUST THE IMPORTS UNDER THAT ITEM AND I JUST -- I ASSIGNED NO 
VALUE TO THE FAMILY PARTNERSHIP. AND SO AGAIN, WHAT I DID TO 
ARRIVE AT MR. SCHMIDT'S VALUATION IS THAT I JUST AVERAGED MR. 
YEANOPLOS'S AND MR. DORTON'S, AND IMPUTED 62,916 TO THE 
PARTNERSHIP. 
NOW, I KNOW THAT MR. THOMAS ARGUED THAT MR. SCHMIDT HAD 
LOOKED OVER WHAT MR. PAPANIKOLAS HAD DONE AND HAD AGREED WITH 
IT, BUT I JUST DIDN'T FEEL COMFORTABLE FOLLOWING THAT. I 
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THINK THERE NEEDED TO BE AN ACTUAL APPRAISAL OR I WAS JUST 
GOING TO TAKE FROM THE AVAILABLE EVIDENCE AN AVERAGE AND 
IMPUTE IT, AND THAT'S WHAT I ENDED UP DOING. SO I IMPUTED 
62,916, AS I SAID. 
NOW, WHEN I ADD ALL THOSE FIGURES UP FROM MR. SCHMIDT, I 
GET A TOTAL VALUATION OF $716,383. AND AS YOU CAN SEE, YOU 
KNOW, THERE'S ALL OF THOSE APPRAISALS, THE THREE APPRAISALS 
ARE RIGHT IN THE BALLPARK WITH ONE ANOTHER. 
NOW, MR. PAPANIKOLAS'S TOTAL VALUATION WAS $473 -- EXCUSE 
ME, $473,700. ALTHOUGH IT IS SUBSTANTIALLY LESS THAN THE 
OTHERS, I STILL FELT THAT IT HAD VALUE AND IT WAS ANOTHER 
APPROACH. AND ONE OF THE REASONS THAT I CHOSE TO DO THAT IS 
FOR A COUPLE OF REASONS. THIS MAN, AND I FOUND HIM TO BE 
HONEST, I DIDN'T FEEL LIKE HE WAS -- WELL, LET'S PUT IT THIS 
WAY: HE WAS VERACIOUS. AND I BELIEVE THAT HE HAD GOOD 
INSIGHT INTO THEIR BUSINESS AND THAT HE WAS A ACCOUNTANT FOR 
ANOTHER AUTOMOTIVE DEALERSHIP, AND SO I THINK THAT PROVIDED 
HIM SOME PERSPECTIVE OF SOME OF THE BUSINESS CALLS IN THE 
EXERCISE OF HIS DISCRETION IN HIS VALUATION. I ALSO GAVE IT 
CREDIBILITY BECAUSE HE UNDERSTOOD THIS PROJECT 2000. HE 
UNDERSTOOD THE PRECARIOUS NATURE OF THE OLDSMOBILE DEALERSHIP. 
HE ALSO HAD BEEN WITH THE COMPANY FOR YEARS, UNDERSTOOD THE 
CYCLICAL NATURE OF THIS INDUSTRY. AND I JUST FELT LIKE, 
AGAIN, HE AND MR. SCHMIDT HAD A -- DIDN'T DECIDE A LOT OF 
THEIR THINGS IN A VACUUM, WHICH I THINK -- I DON'T WANT TO BE 
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UNKIND TO THE OTHER TWO BECAUSE I WAS IMPRESSED WITH THEIR 
OBVIOUS KNOWLEDGE ABOUT WHAT THEY DO. BUT I JUST FELT THAT 
THESE OTHER TWO APPRAISERS HAD A BETTER PULSE ON THIS 
BUSINESS. 
SO I TOOK AND.I AVERAGED ALL OF THEM, AND IN DOING SO I 
COME UP WITH A TOTAL BUSINESS AVERAGE OF $727,585. IF I 
DIVIDE THAT IN HALF, I COME UP WITH MRS. BARBER'S SHARE OF 
$3 63,793. IF I TAKE -- AND I WILL ORDER THAT MR. BARBER PAY 
HER $63,793 AS A DOWN PAYMENT, WHICH LEAVES $300,000, WHICH 
MAY BE SECURED BY A LIEN ON HALF OF THE --OF HIS STOCK. I 
THEN AMORTIZED'THAT $300,000 OVER A 20-YEAR PERIOD. AND I HAD 
TO DO THAT IN ORDER TO EVEN STILL BRING THIS WITHIN A REALM 
THAT HE COULD AFFORD TO BUY HER OUT. MY AMORTIZATION BOOK 
SHOWED FOR $100,000, 7.5 PERCENT FOR 20 YEARS WAS A MONTHLY 
PAYMENT OF $805.60. I MULTIPLIED THAT BY THREE, WHICH 
GIVES -- REQUIRES HIM TO MAKE A MONTHLY PAYOUT TO HER OF 
$2,416.80. 
NOW, WITH RESPECT TO ALIMONY, AND THIS WAS ONE THAT WAS 
THE HARDEST DECISION FOR ME, BUT LET ME JUST TELL YOU WHAT 
I'VE DONE AND WE'LL GO FROM THERE. I START OUT WITH HIS 
$8,025 GROSS MONTHLY INCOME. BACK OUT $2,72 9 FOR TAXES AT 34 
PERCENT, GIVES HIM A NET INCOME OF $5,2 96 PER MONTH. I 
SUBTRACT THE CHILD SUPPORT OF 687, LEAVES HIM $4,609 PER 
MONTH. I SUBTRACT OUT FROM THERE THE $2,417 FOR HIS PAYOUT OF 
PATTY'S INTEREST IN BARBER BROTHERS. LEAVES HIM DISPOSABLE 
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INCOME OF 2,197. I FOUND THAT HIS REASONABLE MONTHLY EXPENSES 
IN LOOKING AT HIS EXHIBITS THAT HE SUBMITTED TO ME, I FOUND 
THEM REASONABLE, AND AT FIRST WAS JUST INCLINED TO APPLY IT, 
THEN REALIZING THAT HIS INCOME OR HIS EXPENSES WERE SLIGHTLY 
IN EXCESS OF HER AND ADRIAN'S, I WENT BACK AND SHARPENED THE 
PENCIL AGAIN AND TRIED TO FIND OUT WHAT COULD BE MOVED OUT. 
AND I COULD FURTHER MOVE OUT $3,200 --OR NOT MOVE OUT, BUT 
REDUCE IT DOWN TO 3,200. SO I FIND THAT HIS REASONABLE 
MONTHLY EXPENSES ARE SOMEWHERE BETWEEN 3,200 AND $3,680. 
NOW, IF I DO THAT WITH EITHER FIGURE, THERE IS A 
SHORTFALL. THERE IS A SHORTFALL RANGING FROM $1,483, IF HIS 
REASONABLE EXPENSES ARE $3,680, TO 1,003 IF HIS REASONABLE 
MONTHLY EXPENSES $3,200. I FIND THAT HER GROSS, ON HER SIDE, 
THAT HER GROSS INCOME IS $1,213. I TOOK OUT 218 FOR TAXES AT 
18 PERCENT, GIVES HER A NET INCOME OF $995. I ADD TO THAT THE 
$687 IN CHILD SUPPORT, GIVES HER DISPOSABLE INCOME OF $1,682. 
I THEN ADDED TO THAT THE $2,417 THAT SHE RECEIVES FROM THE 
PAYOUT OF HER INTEREST IN BARBER BROTHERS, GIVING HER NOW 
$4,90 0 -- OR $4,099 IN DISPOSABLE INCOME. 
I FOUND THAT HER REASONABLE MONTHLY EXPENSES ARE $3,345. 
I FIND THAT FOR MOST OF THE MARRIAGE, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF 
'94 AND PERHAPS '95, THAT HER -- THAT THE FAMILY'S STANDARD OF 
LIVING WAS SOMEWHERE AROUND $3,300. AND THEREFORE, FOR HER 
AND ADRIAN, I FELT COMFORTABLE WITH THE 3,345. BUT SUBTRACTED 
FROM 4,099 GIVES HER A SURPLUS EVERY MONTH OF $754. 
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NOW, I DECLINED TO GIVE ANYTHING FOR ANGELA'S COLLEGE 
FUND, AND I'LL DISCUSS THAT IN A MINUTE. BUT IN ESSENCE, 
THERE'S A -- THE GRANDPARENTS HAVE SET UP A FUND FOR HER, AND 
I'M SATISFIED THAT MR. BARBER WILL PAY -- ASSIST HER WITH HER 
COLLEGE TO THE EXTENT THAT HE CAN BECAUSE OF THE COMMITMENT 
THAT HE HAS TO HIS CHILD. 
BUT BASED ON THIS ANALYSIS, THIS REALLY IS A NO ALIMONY 
CASE. USING THE TYPICAL STANDARDS THAT WE APPLY IN THE JONES 
DECISION, THE PLAINTIFF HAS NO FINANCIAL NEEDS. IN FACT, SHE 
HAS A SURPLUS. SHE CAN PROVIDE ADEQUATELY FOR HERSELF. AND 
IT'S PLAIN THAT THE DEFENDANT CAN'T AFFORD TO PAY ANYTHING 
WHERE HE'S GOT A SHORTFALL. NONETHELESS, I'M GOING TO AWARD 
HER ONE DOLLAR A YEAR ALIMONY JUST TO PROTECT HER IN THE 
INSTANCE OF A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCE. ONCE THE 
CHILD SUPPORT HAS TERMINATED FOR ADRIAN, I WILL THEN ORDER 
THAT HE PAY HER ALIMONY OF $500 A MONTH EQUAL TO THE LENGTH OF 
THE MARRIAGE. 
NOW, IT'S MY ASSESSMENT THAT THEY'LL BOTH LIKELY INCREASE 
IN THEIR INCOME OVER THE YEARS, BUT MR. BARBER WILL INCREASE 
HIS AT A SUBSTANTIALLY HIGHER RATE AND, THEREFORE, I STILL 
FEEL THAT IT'S APPROPRIATE THAT HE PAY SOME ALIMONY. IN THE 
IMMEDIATE FUTURE, IT'S JUST A NO ALIMONY CASE IN MY VIEW. BUT 
IF THERE WERE SUFFICIENT INCOMES, I WOULD PLAINLY AWARD 
ALIMONY. AND I WILL TELL YOU, AND THIS IS WHAT I STRUGGLED 
WITH, THAT I AM TROUBLED THAT SHE IS HAVING TO USE HER STOCK 
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EQUITY TO SUPPORT HERSELF. SHE IS IN EFFECT PAYING PART OF 
THE ALIMONY OBLIGATION THAT HE WOULD OTHERWISE HAVE. BUT I 
CAN'T SEE ANY OTHER WAY AROUND IT. THERE IS NO WAY THAT I 
COULD BACK OUT THE CHILD SUPPORT, BACK OUT A REASONABLE AMOUNT 
OF ALIMONY BASED ON JUST THEIR INCOMES AND THEIR OTHER 
EXPENSES, IGNORING THIS OTHER DEBT THAT HE HAS TO HER, AND 
THEN TRY TO PAY OUT HER EQUITY IN THE BUSINESS. IT JUST WON'T 
OCCUR DURING HIS LIFETIME. AND SHE WON'T REALIZE IT ANYWAY. 
AND IN THE SHORT TERM, I THINK THERE IS MORE SECURITY BY 
GIVING HER THAT MONTHLY PAYOUT THAN DEALING WITH AN ALIMONY 
PAYMENT THAT COULD CHANGE IF SHE REMARRIES. I THINK THE COURT 
HAS A RESPONSIBILITY TO MAKE A DIVISION OF ASSETS AND INCOME 
SO THAT BOTH PARTIES CAN READJUST THEIR LIFE SITUATION AS WELL 
AS POSSIBLE, AND I BELIEVE WHAT I'VE DONE BEST ADDRESSES THAT. 
THE COURT CONSIDERED CONTINUING A JOINT OWNERSHIP OF THE 
STOCK SO THAT A FAIR SUM OF ALIMONY COULD BE PAID, BUT JOINT 
OWNERSHIP OF STOCK OF A CLOSELY HELD CORPORATION IN THE 
COURT'S JUDGMENT SHOULD BE AVOIDED. 
I CONSIDERED JUST ORDERING THAT THE STOCK BE SOLD, WHICH 
WOULD GIVE HER AT LEAST SOMETHING RIGHT NOW, AND THEN ALLOW 
HIM TO PAY ALIMONY. BUT I THINK IN THE PROCESS, THEY WILL 
TAKE AN ENORMOUS HIT BY A CAPITAL GAINS TAX LIABILITY. IT 
WOULD DESTROY HIM FINANCIALLY, WHICH WILL ONLY REDOUND ON HER 
BECAUSE HE THEN WON'T BE IN A POSITION TO PAY ALIMONY ANYWAY. 
AND IF I WERE TO DO OTHERWISE AND JUST ARBITRARILY STICK HIM 
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1 WITH THE $500 A MONTH ALIMONY THAT THE PLAINTIFF REQUESTED, IT 
2 WOULD ONLY TEMPT HIM TO GO INTO THE BUSINESS AND RAID IT TO 
3 MEET HIS OBLIGATIONS, WHICH WOULD ONLY COMPOUND AN 
4 UNDERCAPITALIZATION PROBLEM THAT I SEE IN THE BUSINESS. AND I 
5 JUST -- IT'S JUST A DIFFICULT PROPOSITION. I WOULD LIKE TO 
6 AWARD HER ALIMONY, I THINK IT'S APPROPRIATE IN THIS CASE, BUT 
7 I CAN'T ORDER HIM TO PAY MORE THAN WHAT'S POSSIBLE. 
8 AS A PARTIAL JUSTIFICATION, THE COURT WAS TROUBLED BY THE 
9 EVIDENCE THAT WAS ADDUCED AT TRIAL THAT THE DEFENDANT IN THIS 
10 CASE DELAYED NEARLY SIX MONTHS APPOINTING MR. NEELEY AFTER MR. 
11 CUSTEN WITHDREW. I FIND THAT THE EVIDENCE PREPONDERATES THAT 
12 MR. NEELEY DELIBERATELY DELAYED MISS BARBER BECAUSE HE 
13 ANTICIPATED A BRIGHTER OUTLOOK FOR THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY. 
14 NOW, IN MAKING THAT FINDING, I AM NOT BEING CRITICAL OF MR. 
15 NEELEY. I HOLD HIM IN HIGH REGARD BOTH ETHICALLY AND FOR HIS 
16 SKILLS AS A LAWYER. I DEEM WHAT OCCURRED HERE IS JUST AN ACT 
17 OF ADVOCACY. BUT THIS DELAY DEFINITELY INURED TO THE BENEFIT 
18 OF THE PLAINTIFF AND TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE DEFENDANT. IF 
19 THE MAY '95 EVALUATION, WHICH WAS THE SECOND EVALUATION, HAD 
20 BEEN USED, HE COULD HAVE -- THAT IS, MR. BARBER COULD HAVE 
21 PAID A REASONABLE AMOUNT OF ALIMONY AND PAID HER VALUE OF THE 
22 BUSINESS AT THAT TIME. AND THERE WAS SOME TEMPTATION ON MY 
23 PART JUST TO GO AND USE THAT MAY '95 EVALUATION. BUT I 
24 STRUGGLED BECAUSE I THINK THE COURT HAS ALSO THE 
25 RESPONSIBILITY TO USE THE MOST CURRENT INFORMATION AT THE TIME 
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OF THE DIVORCE. BUT HAD I MORE FULLY UNDERSTOOD WHAT WAS 
OCCURRING BACK IN '95, WHAT HAD OCCURRED IN '94 AND '95, I MAY 
HAVE JUST STOPPED EVERYTHING RIGHT THERE AND MADE THEM GO 
FORWARD WITH THE '95 EVALUATION. BUT IT'S WATER UNDER THE 
BRIDGE. WE HAVE THE EVALUATION AND THE COURT HAS THAT 
INFORMATION AND I'VE ELECTED TO USE IT. BUT I FIND THAT SHE 
REAPS THE BENEFIT OF DORTON'S EVALUATION AND, THEREFORE, WILL 
PAY HIS FEES AFTER THE SECOND EVALUATION. 
ALL RIGHT. WE ARE RUNNING OUT OF TIME. LET ME JUST 
QUICKLY GO THROUGH AND MAKE JUST OFFHAND OBSERVATIONS THAT CAN 
BE USED. I FIND THAT THERE IS A $12,000 COLLEGE FUND THAT 
COULD BE USED FOR ANGELA'S EDUCATION. 
I FIND THAT PLAINTIFF IS A HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATION, HAS 
ONE YEAR OF COLLEGE AT WEBER STATE UNIVERSITY, AND EXCEPT FOR 
ONE YEAR IN WHICH SHE WAS A SUBSTITUTE TEACHER, SHE DIDN'T 
WORK. SHE'S BEEN A HOMEMAKER. 
I FIND THAT IN SETTING SALARIES IN EACH OF THE BUSINESS 
STORES, THE BROTHERS HAVE A HIGH DEGREE OF TRUST AND RESPECT 
FOR ONE ANOTHER AND ARE NOT INCLINED TO DO ANYTHING THAT WOULD 
BE HEAVY-HANDED. I THINK THIS FAMILY PARTNERSHIP HAS WORKED 
WELL BECAUSE EACH BROTHER HAS BEEN RELUCTANT TO TAKE A HARD 
STAND ON ISSUES, BUT TO DEFER TO WHAT THE MAJORITY WANTED. 
AND BECAUSE OF THAT HIGH DEGREE OF RESPECT, I DON'T THINK THAT 
MR. BARBER CAN JUST DO WHAT HE WANTS TO DO, EVEN THOUGH HE HAS 
THE MAJORITY INTEREST IN THE ONE ENTITY THAT HE OPERATES. I 
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THINK WHEN HE SAID THAT IT WOULD BE BAD BUSINESS JUDGMENT TO 
JUST FIX MY SALARY WITHOUT CONSIDERATION OF MY BROTHERS' 
FEELINGS, WAS CORRECT. AND THAT VIEW IS CORROBORATED BY MR. 
PAPANIKOLAS. FOR HIM TO TAKE A HIGH SALARY TO MEET HIS 
OBLIGATION THE PLAINTIFF FORESEES WOULD BE APPROPRIATE IN THIS 
CASE IN TERMS OF A BUSINESS BUY-OUT WOULD BE -- WOULD CAUSE 
GREAT DISHARMONY AND DISRUPTION OF THE BUSINESS. 
I FIND THAT HIS ABILITY TO GENERATE INCOME HAS BEEN 
DIMINISHED. SINCE HIS UNFORTUNATE PLANE CRASH AND LOSS OF HIS 
EYE, I FIND THAT HE DOES SUFFER FATIGUE. THAT WHEREAS BEFORE 
HE COULD PUT IN EIGHT TO TEN HOURS, HE PROBABLY NOW ONLY CAN 
PUT IN THREE OR FOUR HOURS MAXIMUM, THEN HE'S HAD TO HIRE 
OTHER PEOPLE TO DO SOME OF THE FUNCTIONS THAT HE DOES. AND 
THAT ALSO IN THE LONG RUN IS GOING LIMIT HIS ABILITY TO 
GENERATE INCOME. AND THAT'S ALL THE MORE REASON WHY I WAS 
RELUCTANT TO SET IT HIGHER THAN I DID. 
I FIND THAT FRED'S SALARY IS HIGHER THAN THE OTHERS, BUT 
THAT'S BECAUSE HE PAYS FOR HIS PARENTS' CAR, AND THAT ALSO 
ACCOUNTS FOR A GOOD BUSINESS BONUS. 
FIND THAT THE CAR INDUSTRY IS VERY CYCLICAL. I FIND 1994 
TO BE SOMEWHAT OF AN ABERRATION. I FIND THAT IF MR. BARBER 
CAN BUY OUT MRS. BARBER'S INTEREST UNDER THE PROPERTY 
SETTLEMENT, THERE IS NO TAX SALE; THEREFORE, THERE IS NO TAX 
CONSEQUENCE, AND THAT THEIR BASIS IN THE PROPERTY REMAINS THE 
SAME. BUT IF THERE IS A FORCED SALE, HE WILL PAY THE CAPITAL 
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GAINS AFTER HER INTEREST HAS BEEN PRESERVED. AND THEREFORE, 
HE WILL TAKE THE WHOLE HIT AND SHE WILL HAVE NO LOSSES. AND 
THAT HAS ALSO INFLUENCED ME AS I HAVE FIXED THESE EVALUATIONS. 
I'VE JUST TRIED TO DO WHAT I THINK IS THE FAIR THING. 
I FIND THAT DEFENDANT IS A RESPONSIBLE PARENT AND THAT HE 
WILL HELP ANGELA SO LONG AS SHE IS ALSO A RESPONSIBLE STUDENT. 
I FIND THAT THE OLDSMOBILE INDUSTRY IS COLD. I'VE TALKED 
ABOUT THE SALES. I FIND THAT THE GENERAL MOTORS PROJECT 2000 
TO BE A REAL ISSUE. NOTWITHSTANDING ANY DOCUMENTS THAT WERE 
PROVIDED, I THINK THAT THAT WILL HAVE A SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN 
THE FRANCHISING. I FIND THAT IT'S CONSOLIDATING OR WILL CAUSE 
A CONSOLIDATION OF FRANCHISES. I FIND THAT THERE'S A HIGH 
PROBABILITY OF THE OLDSMOBILE INDUSTRY OR FRANCHISE WILL BE 
LOST TO MR. BARBER. NOW, HE MAY REPLACE IT, BUT WE DON'T KNOW 
WHAT HE'S GOING TO REPLACE IT WITH. AND ALTHOUGH GENERAL 
MOTORS IS GOING TO GIVE HIM SOMEWHAT OF A BUY-OUT, IT ISN'T 
GOING TO AMOUNT TO A GREAT DEAL IN THE COURT'S JUDGMENT. AND 
ALTHOUGH HE SAID THERE NO'S GUARANTEE ABOUT THE PONTIAC 
FRANCHISE, I FIND THAT MR. BARBER RUNS A REALLY GOOD BUSINESS. 
AND THAT HE WILL PRESERVE THAT BUSINESS. 
LET ME JUST TALK ABOUT THE CREDIBILITY OF THE PARTIES FOR 
JUST A MINUTE. I FOUND THAT BOTH PEOPLE, BOTH OF THESE 
PARTIES, ARE JUST REALLY GOOD, DECENT PEOPLE. I LIKED BOTH OF 
THEM VERY, VERY MUCH. AND I FOUND THAT MRS. BARBER WAS HIGHLY 
CREDIBLE IN HER OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE BUSINESS. TO THE 
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EXTENT THAT SHE WOULD KNOW, AND I KNOW THAT THERE WERE 
IMPRESSIONS THAT SHE HAD ABOUT HIS CONTROL IN THE BUSINESS, 
AND I THINK THAT SAM DOES HAVE A LOT OF INFLUENCE IN THAT 
BUSINESS, BEING THE OLDEST BROTHER AND HAVING BEEN IN THE 
INDUSTRY FOR A LOT-OF YEARS, BUT I THINK THAT WAS OVERSTATED, 
NOT CONSCIOUSLY, BUT JUST HER HONEST -- I THINK THAT'S THE WAY 
SHE SEES IT. BUT AS I HAVE EXPLAINED BEFORE, I THINK IN 
REALITY THERE'S A LOT OF GIVE AND TAKE BETWEEN THOSE BROTHERS. 
I FOUND THAT THE DEFENDANT, ALTHOUGH IN A POSITION TO BE VERY 
SELF-SERVING DURING THIS TRIAL, WAS NOT. THE COURT WAS 
REPEATEDLY IMPRESSED THAT HE WAS A HIGHLY PRINCIPLED, HONEST 
MAN, AND THAT I FOUND THAT HE WAS HONEST WITH THE COURT. AND 
THAT HIS ASSESSMENT OF THE FUTURE OF THE BUSINESS AND WHAT HE 
COULD DO IN THE BUSINESS AND HIS INCOME, I PUT A LOT OF WEIGHT 
ON THAT. 
I FIND THAT ALL FOUR BROTHERS HAVE COMPARABLE SALARIES. 
THERE ARE SLIGHT DIFFERENCES BASED ON BONUSES AND MEETING 
THERE OBJECTIVES. TALKED ABOUT FRED'S SALARY. I FIND THAT 
ALL BARBER BROTHER ENTITIES ARE UNDERCAPITALIZED. 
WELL, I THINK THAT'S ABOUT THAT I CAN GIVE YOU THIS 
MORNING. I APOLOGIZE FOR TAKING SO LONG. PLEASE DO THE BEST 
THAT YOU CAN IN PUTTING THAT TOGETHER. LET ME JUST TELL YOU 
THAT THIS IS MY BEST SHOT. IF WITH THIS GUIDANCE THE TWO OF 
YOU CAN SEE A BETTER WAY THAT WOULD NOT ONLY ACHIEVE FAIRNESS 
FOR BOTH THE PARTIES, BUT WOULD ALSO MAKE A BETTER LEGAL 
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DECISION --IN OTHER WORDS, I'M NOT WORRIED IF IT CASE GOES UP 
ON APPEAL. I'VE JUST DONE BEST THAT I CAN, AND IF THREE OTHER 
PEOPLE WHO ARE WISER AND OUT OF THEIR COLLECTIVE JUDGMENT CAN 
SEE A BETTER APPROACH, I'D WELCOME THAT. BUT IF YOU HAVE SEEN 
THAT I'VE MADE AN OBVIOUS ERROR -- AND FRANKLY, THE ALIMONY 
QUESTION HAS TROUBLED ME A GREAT DEAL -- AND YOU CAN SEE A 
BETTER WAY AND YOU WANT TO GET BACK TO ME AND THE THREE OF US 
SIT DOWN AND DISCUSS THIS BEFORE WE FINALIZE THE FINDINGS, I'M 
CERTAINLY AMENABLE TO THIS. 
THIS WAS A VERY DIFFICULT CASE FOR THE COURT AND I'VE 
JUST DONE THE BEST THAT I CAN. AND IF THERE ARE INADEQUACIES 
IN IT, I'M SORRY. GIVE MY BEST TO BOTH OF THE PARTIES AND LET 
THEM KNOW THAT THE DECISION I'M SURE IS NOT PERFECT, BUT IT'S 
THE BEST THAT THIS JUDGE CAN DO. GOOD LUCK TO YOU. 
MR. THOMAS: THANK YOU, JUDGE. 
MR. NEELEY: THANK YOU, JUDGE. 
THE COURT: BYE. 
***** 
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§7.07 TOTAL VALUE METHOD 533 
Goodwill 
Finally, if the business involved has divisible good will/-10 the court must add 
its value to the sum total of the tangible assets. If the court uses the total value 
approach and fails to value good will, it commits e r ro r unless it plausibly 
explains the omission.-11 
Good will is only one e lement of the overall value of the business, and it 
is not a separate and distinct asset possessed by the owning spouse. As a mat ter 
of law, therefore, when a spouse is only an employee of the business and has 
no stock or o ther ownership interest in it, there is no good will to divide.'-'-
Courts have used a n u m b e r of different me thods for valuing good will: 
Excess Earnings Method. Perhaps the most c o m m o n me thod for valuing good 
will is the excess earnings a p p r o a c h . - n Under this me thod , the court first com-
putes the difference between the actual earnings of the business and the earn-
ings of the " ave rage" or " reasonab le ' ' business . This difference is then 
"capitalized/ ' or multiplied by some n u m b e r (the fartor) between one and 
five.-'14 
210 y n e divisibility of good will is discussed in detail in §6.22. \ o summarize that 
discussion, good will is almosi alwavs marital propertv where the business or practice 
involved can be sold on the open market. Where the business or practice has limited 
marketability the cases are deeply divided. Where the business involved is not market-
able, therefore, it is important to determine whether divisible good will exists before 
applying the principles discussed in this subection. 
-»' E.g.Matsuo v Matsuo, 124 A.D.2d 864. 508 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1986); Dorian v Dorton, 
11 N.C App. 667. 336 S.E.2d 415 (1985). 
Where there is no evidence in the record on the value of good will, however, good 
will need not be valued. Hmchfeldv. Hirschfeld, 96 A.D.2d 473, 464 N.V.S.2d 789 (1983); 
In re Xordby, 41 Wash. App. 531, 705 P.2d 277 (1985). 
-'- See Sonek v. Sonek, 105 N.C. App. 247, 412 S.E.2d 917 (1992), cert granted, 331 
N.C. 287, 417 S.E.2d 255 (1992); In re Stuart, 107 Or. App. 549. 813 P.2d 49 (1991); 
In re Hall, 103 Wash. 2d 236, 692 P.2d 175 (1984); see also St. Pierre
 v. St. Pierre, 357 
N.\V.2d 250 (S.D. 1984). 
-
,,:<
 For cases using the excess earnings method, see, e.g.. Hunt v. Hunt, 698 P.2d 1 168 
(Alaska 1985); In re Huff, 834 P.2d 244'(Colo. 1992); In re Boohout, 833 P.2d 800 (Colo. 
Ci. App. 1991); Eslami r. Eslanu, 218 Conn. 801, 591 A.2d 41 1 (1991); Clark v. Clark, 
782 S.W.2d 56 (Kv. Ct. App. 1990); Xelson v. Xelson,4\l N.W.2d 868 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1(J87); Schlachet v. Schlachet, 176 A.D.2d 198, 574 N.V.S.2d 320 (1991): Smith v. Smith, 
- N.C. App 433 S.E.2d 196 (1993); /// re Sharon, 178 Wis. 2d 481, 504 N.W.2d 
415 (Ct. App. \993)\ see also Drake v. Drake, 809 S.W.2d 710 (Kv. Ct. App. 1991) (where 
business had $23,000 annual excess earnings, error to hold that business had only mar-
ginal good will). 
"
,
"
1
 l*or cases generally setting forth how the excess earnings method works, see, e.g., 
D
*Win v, Dugan] 92 N.J. 423, 457 A.2d 1 (1983); ////;;/ v. Hunt, 698 P.2d 1 168 (Alaska 
1(
^85); Drake v. Drake, 809 S.W.2d 710 (Kv. Ct. App. 1991); Smith v. Smith, _ N.C. App. 
—' ^33 S.E.2d 196 (1993). Instead of multiplying bv a factor, some courts and experts 
Prclei to divide bv a percentage. E.g., In re Hull, 219 Mont. 480, 712 P.2d 1317 (1986). 
"c difference, of course, is only a matter of mathematics. 
One court suggested that a factor of three (or a percentage of 33%) should be used 
n
 the absence of evidence that another factor would be more accurate. See Dugan v. 
^> / .92N. J .423 .457A.2d 1 (1983). For cases considering the proper factor or capital-
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For tax purposes , the IRS follows a slightly different version of the excess 
earnings method.- , :> Under the IRS me thod , the evaluator measures the tangi-
ble assets of the business, and de te rmines an average rate of return on tangible 
assets for a business in the same situation as the business being valued. Multi-
plying the tangible assets by the average rate of re turn yields the average earn-
ings, which are subtracted from the actual earnings to get the businesses excess 
earnings . If the business is a sole propr ie torsh ip , the owner 's salary is further 
subtracted from the excess earnings . T h e excess earnings are then multiplied 
by the factor to yield the final value. 
A small n u m b e r of decisions have attacked the excess earnings method on 
g rounds that it divides the future earnings of the owning spouse.- ,<1 This criti-
cism is entirely unjustified. By capitalizing only the excess earnings of the owning 
spouse , the excess earnings me thod actually excludes most future earnings 
from considerat ion. T h e fundamental assumpt ion of the method is that by 
looking only at earnings above the average salary of similar persons in the same 
field, the court can focus narrowly upon that segment of future earnings which 
is actually a t t r ibutable to previously existing good will. A court which uses the 
excess earnings method is therefore no more dividing future earnings than is 
a court which divides a pension. In both instances, the court is treating future 
benefits as marital proper ty because they were earned during the marriage. 
It is also significant to no te that the excess earnings method is well accepted 
a m o n g accountants as a valid measure of the transferable good will of a busi-
ness. Accountants actually use the me thod in recommending to their clients 
prices at which to buy and sell existing business.-17 If the excess earnings 
ization rate, see /// re Hull, 219 Mont. 480, 712 P.2d 1317 (1986) (selecting a more con-
servative 40% rate because the husband's anesthesiology practice generated little 
repeat business); Smith v. Smith, _ N.C. App 433 ST.2d 196 (1993) (using a 16% 
rate, because business had a higher degree of risk than normal; proper to use 16% even 
though no expert had used precisely that figure). 
An expert applying the method should make certain to state the basis for his (actor 
or percentage. See Bowen v. Bowen, 96 N.J. 36, 473 A.2d 73 (1984) (valuation which used 
factor of five without explanation was not credible). 
-'••> See Rev. Rul. 68-609, 1968-2 C.B. 327; see also In re Hall, 103 Wash. 2d 236, 692 
P.2d 175, 180 (1984). 
-'<•• The best example is Hanson v. Hanson, 738 S.W.2d 429 (Mo. 1987), where the 
court held that professional good will can be valued only bv proof of actual comparable 
sales. Hanson is further discussed and criticized in §6.22. See also Taylor v. Taylor, 736 
S.W.2d 388 (Mo. 1987) (rejecting a purely formula-based valuation); Hollander v. Hol-
lander, 89 Md. App. 156, 597 A.2d 1012, 1021 n.8 (1991) (dicta attacking the excess 
earnings method): Mocmk v. Moauk, 838 P.2d 500 (Okla. 1992). 
A later Missouri decision refused to apply Hanson where the cause involved business 
rather than professional good will. /// re Brooks, 742 S.VV.2d 585 (Mo. Ct. App. \WD> 
217
 For instance, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants lists excess 
earnings as one of "the most popular approaches to business valuation in its 1987 man-
agement advisory services practices aid for CPAs." Zipp, Divorce I'aluatton of Business 
Interests: A Capitalization of Earnings Approach, 23 Fam. L.Q. 89, 91 (1989), quoting Ameri-
can Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Small Business Consulting Practice Ai 
No. 8 (1987). It is also significant to note that the IRS regularly uses excess earnings 
to value businesses for tax purposes. See Rev. Rul. 68-609, 1968-2 C.B. 327. Since future 
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method did include future earnings and individual reputat ion in its value for 
good will, it would not provide an accurate est imate of the transferable good 
will of a business for t rade and tax purposes . Because excess earnings is actually 
used by accountants when de te rmin ing the sale price of a business, it is an 
equallv valid me thod for courts to use in valuing businesses upon divorce. 
Actual Earnings. T h e accuracy of the earnings approach obviously depends 
heavily upon the accuracy of the statistics used in the computa t ion . Actual earn-
ings should be based upon the average earnings over a period of several years, 
so that r andom fluctuations do not unduly affect the value.218 When determin-
ing the business 's actual earnings, the court should include fringe benefits and 
other corpora te funds spent for the personal benefit of the owner.-19 If the 
expenses of the business were excessive, they can be reduced to reasonable 
levels for valuation purposes.-- 0 T h e court must consider depreciat ion as a 
legitimate deduct ion from income unless equ ipment was acquired deliberately 
to reduce income.--1 A reasonable salary for the owner must also be t reated 
as an expense.2-- T h e decisions disagree on whether the court should look to 
pre-tax or post-tax earnings.22* Where the earnings of the business vary signifi-
earnings and individual reputation are not subject to taxation, the IRS would not use 
a method which included these benefits in valuing a business. The IRS's decision to 
use excess earnings is therefore another indication that the method reaches fair results 
for valuing propertv upon divorce. 
In light of these other uses, capitalization of excess earnings is simplv not a method 
invented by biased experts for the purposes of dividing future earnings and giving larger 
values to businesses It is. instead, a generally accepted accounting method which is 
used for many purposes other than dividing property at divorce. Decisions which are 
skeptical of retained earnings have often displayed no awareness of this fact. E.g., 
Hanson v. Hanson, 738 S.\V.2d 429 (Mo. 1987). Attorneys reiving on the excess earnings 
method would therefore do well to stress to the court its wide level of acceptance among 
accountants for purposes other than valuing property upon divorce. 
2,H
 E.g.. Dugan v. Dugan, 92 N.J. 423. 457 A.2d 1 (1983) (suggesting that five years* 
earnings be used). 
2,,)
 See Lewis v. Lewis, 106 N.M. 105, 739 P.2d 974 (Ct. App. 1987); Stolow r. Stolon: 
149A.D.2d683,540N.V.S.2d484 (1989); Siegel v. Siege!, 132 A.D.2d 247, 523 N.V.S.2d 
517(1987). 
220
 See Eslanu v. Eslami, 218 Conn. 801, 591 A.2d 4 1 1 (1991). 
221
 See Moffitt v. MoJ/itt, 813 P.2d 074 (Alaska 1991); cf. Smith v. Smith. _ N.C. App. 
—, 433 ST.2d 196 (1993) (proper to exclude depreciation as a deduction, where it had 
already been considered in setting income). 
222
 Id.; In re Brenner. 235 111. App. 3d 840, 601 NT.2d 1270 (1992); cj. Money v. Money, 
852 P.2d 1158 (Alaska 1993) (bonuses and any income taxes paid upon them should 
«ot be subtracted). 
"-'•'* A majority of the cases seem to capitalize pre-tax earnings. See Stolow v. Stolow. 
H9A.I).2d683, 540 N.VS.2d 484 (1989): Siegel v. Siegel, 132 A.D.2d 247, 523 N.V.S.2d 
517 (1987) (error to use post-tax earnings); Clark v. Clark, 782 S.\V.2d 56 (Ky. Ct. App. 
J990) (capitalizing pre-tax excess earnings); Smith v. Smith N.C. App 433 ST.2d 
196 (1993). One reportedtase capitalizes post-tax excess earnings. See Lewis v. Lewis, 
W> N.M. 105, 739 P.2d 974 (Ct. App. 1987). 
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cantly from year to year, the court should use an average figure.224 
Average Earnings. In addition, it is important that the average earnings figures 
be as accurate as possible. Where there are a large number of businesses 
nationwide which practice in the relevant field, the average earnings should 
be those of similar businesses in the same locality. For instance, where a north-
ern New Jersey law practice is involved, the data base should ideally be limited 
to attorneys in New Jersey or even northern New Jersey.22'1 
Where the number of businesses in the field is small and the market is essen-
tially nationwide, however, broader statistics may be used. For instance, in 
Nelson v Nelson,--1' the husband was a highly specialized certified engineer. He 
was the only such engineer in the state, and there were only 95 such engineers 
in the entire nation. The court affirmed the use of nationwide statistics.227 
Nationwide statistics may also be the only option where local statistics are not 
available or where the small local sample size prevents collection of reliable 
information. Nationwide data will always be more persuasive where an expert 
expressly testifies that the data is consistent with local conditions.228 
Regardless of whether localized average earnings are preferred, familiarity 
with local practice is not part of the foundation for admitting expert testimony 
into evidence.22" The expert's familiarity with local practice is instead a substan-
tial factor in determining the weight of his testimony. Where the expert lacks 
personal familiarity with the area, he can obtain the necessary information on 
average earnings from other sources, such as surveys, other experts, or a stipu-
lation signed by the parties.2™ 
The average earnings must also be closely tailored to an operator with the 
same age, experience, and time commitment as the owning spouse. For exam-
ple, it is error to compare the owning spouse's earnings in a 60-hour week with 
224
 See In re King, 150 Cal. App. 3d 304, 197 Cal. Rptr. 716 (1983) (error to use values 
for only one year, where earnings for that year were abnormally high compared to the 
business's actual earning capacity). 
^ See Dugan v. Dugan, 92 NJ. 423, 457 A.2d 1 (1983); see also In re Kapusta, 141 111. 
App. 3d 1010, 491 N.E.2d 48 (1986); Johnson v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 696 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989) (use of nationwide data distorted value of highly specialized local practice); cf. 
Eslami v. Eslami, 218 Conn. 801, 591 A.2d 4 11 (1991) (using data from survey by profes-
sional organization which monitored sales of radiology practices; of 17 specific sales 
listed, five were from Connecticut). 
-'-'Mil N.W.2d 868 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). 
-'-'
7
 See also In re Bookout, 833 P.2d 800 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991) (using data from survey 
by American Physical Therapists Association); Clark v. Clark, 782 S.W.2d 56 (Ky. Ct. 
App. 1990) (using data from American Medical Association survey of obstetrical prac-
tices); /// re Hull, 712 P.2d 1317 (Mont. 1986) (using data from survey of eight western 
states in valuing anesthesiology practice). 
-"-'" See In re Keyser, 820 P.2d 1194 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991) (proper to use nationwide 
data where expert testified that data was consistent with local market). 
-'
2<> /// re White, 151 111. App. 3d 778, 502 N.E.2d 1084 (1986). 
2M) See id. (expert properly relied on parties' stipulation of average earnings, combined 
with general information on the number of similar businesses in the area). 
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the average pract i t ioner 's earnings in a 40-hour week.2*1 Likewise, the average 
salary should not be based upon a certain pe rcen tage of assets, because salary 
and physical assets are not necessarily related.--'*- Where data were available 
for both self-employed and salaried physical therapists , one court held that 
the data for salaried employees should be used, reasoning that it was a fairer 
measure of the true value of the therapist 's services.21* 
If the court de te rmines that the business 's actual earnings are equal to or 
less than the average earnings , the excess earnings me thod shows that the busi-
ness has no good will.2*4 Th i s does not mean , however, that the entire business 
has no value. Excess earnings is only a me thod for valuing good will, and a 
business without excess earnings is still worth at least the total net value of 
its tangible assets.--™ 
Capitalization of excess earnings is probably the most generally accepted 
valuation method . Nevertheless , there are some situations in which it yields 
an incorrect value. In particular, courts have been reluctant to accept a value 
based on excess earnings where there is evidence that the owner has deliber-
ately depressed the business 's earnings in o rde r to minimize the value of its 
good will.2*6 
Courts have also been careful to review the results reached by the excess 
earnings me thod in light of the actual facts of the case. Where the me thod 
reaches a result which is inconsistent with c o m m o n sense,2*7 and particularly 
where the result is inconsistent with information on actual prior sales,2*8 courts 
have rejected valuations based on excess earnings . 
'-'" See Dugan v. Dugan, 92 N.J. 43, 457 A.2d 1 (1983); In re Kapusta, 141 111. App. 3d 
1010,491 N.E.2d 48 (1986). 
2:
*
2
 See Dugan v. Dugan, 92 N.J. 43, 457 A.2d 1 (1983). 
2:
*
:
* See In re Bookout, 833 P.2d 800 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991). The court viewed the data 
for self-employed therapists as less reliable, because self-employed persons control 
their own salaries and often alter them upward or downward for purely personal rea-
sons. 
2
** E.g., Lei>y v. Levy, 164 N.J. Super. 542, 397 A.2d 374 (Ch. Div. 1978) (law practice 
in only fair economic health held to have no excess earnings and thus no good will); 
see also Miles v. Miles, 816 P.2d 129 (Alaska 1991) (lobbying practice had zero good will). 
2:B
 In re Gamiy/Bishton, 181 Cal. App. 3d 675, 226 Cal. Rptr. 485 (1986). 
2:
*" See Russell v. Russell, 11 Va. App. 411, 399 S.E.2d 166 (1990) (trial court properlv 
rejected excess earnings, where husband deliberatelv kept earnings from medical prac-
tice at artificially low level); /;/ re Hall, 103 Wash. 2d 236, 692 P.2d 175, 179 (1984) 
(practice had good will, even though there were no excess earnings, where owning 
spouse deliberately limited his hours of practice). 
2:
*
7
 See In re Reiling, 66 Or. App. 284, 673 P.2d 1360 (1983), cert, denied, _ Or. _ , 
678 P.2d 738 (1984) (wife's expert found good will under excess earnings, but the wife 
presented no evidence of the husband's health, reputation, or work habits, held insuffi-
cient evidence to support award of good will). 
2:
*» See Spillert v. Spillert, 564 So. 2d 1 146 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (valuation based 
on excess earnings was not credible, where expert had not considered extremely limited 
marketability of similar practices):yo////io// v. Johnson, 111 P.2d 696 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
(trial court properly rejected capitalization of excess earnings, where recent buyer of 
l
"e husband's interest had paid nothing for good will, and the corporation's profits 
depended largely upon one customer, which was gradually reducing its business); see 
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A business with no net asset value, however, can still be given a posi-
tive value for purposes of equitable distribution. If the business has 
significant potential future earnings, it may have substantial goodwill 
which should be treated as a valuable asset for divorce purposes. Alter-
natively, the court could use some variant of the total value method 
(See generally §7.08) to conclude that the business as a whole could be 
sold on the open market for a positive sum, despite its theoretical lack 
of net value. See Dempster v. Dempster, 204 A.D.2d 1070, 613 N.Y.S.2d 
78 (1994) (error to hold that business in Chapter 13 bankruptcy reor-
ganization had no value; business had substantial future earning poten-
tial); see also Pleasant v. Pleasant, 97 Md. App. 711, 632 A.2d 202 (1993) 
(error to hold that business with negative income had no value). 
Page 533, note 213\ add: 
For additional cases using the excess earnings method, see Olsen v. 
Olsen, 125 Idaho 603, 873 P.2d 857 (1994); In re Talty, 191 111. App. 
3d 451, 623 N.E.2d 1041 (1993) (for business with realizable goodwill); 
McCoy v. McCoy, 91 Ohio App. 3d 570, 632 N.E.2d 1358 (1993); Endres 
v. Endres, 532 N.W.2d 65 (S.D. 1995) (concrete business). 
In Skrabak v. Skrabak, 108 Md. App. 633, 673 A.2d 732 (1996), the 
court did an excellent job of stating how the excess earnings method 
should be used in a state where only realizable good will constitutes 
marital property. The court firmly rejected any suggestion that the 
method is inherently improper, but stressed that as a prerequisite to 
using the method, the spouse seeking to employ it must show that real-
izable good will exists. 
Skrabak is much better reasoned than the decisions discussed in note 
216 infra, many of which express doubts about the validity of excess 
earnings. As noted in the main volume, there is no doubt that excess 
earnings is an accurate method for valuing goodwill, and states which 
refuse to consider it are excluding the best available valuation method. 
To the extent that the method values goodwill which is not marital 
property, the proper remedy is to require threshold evidence of r eada-
bility, and not to reject the method altogether. Skrabak did an excellent 
job of reconciling Maryland's rule that only unrealizable good will can-
not be divided, see generally §6.22, with the need for accurate valuation 
of goodwill which does constitute marital property. 
Page 533, note 214, add: 
For additional sample cases showing how excess earnings works, see 
White v. White, 204 A.D.2d 825, 611 N.Y.S.2d 951 (1994) (finding sev-
eral errors in use of the method by parties' experts, and recomputing 
the value of the business in considerable detail using corrected data; 
actual calculations attached as an appendix). 
For additional cases addressing the proper factor or capitalization 
rate, see Olsen v. Olsen, 125 Idaho 603, 873 P.2d 857 (1994) (error to 
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When divorce confronts a business owner there is fear of 
losing the business in a battle over marital property. To the 
spouse, there is fear that the single most valuable marital asset 
may not be properly considered by the divorce court. 
Both parties have real fears, because both possibilities can 
become realities without adeguate planning and the development of 
strategies to deal with business interests in a divorce. 
The development of strategies in divorce litigation 
involving business interests requires the combined efforts of the 
attorney, a business appraiser, a tax expert, a financial 
planner, and the divorcing client. Regardless of whether the 
client is the business owner or the spouse, these professionals 
must work with the divorcing client to plan the litigation and 
form valuation, tax, and financial strategies to develop, 
support, and sustain the client's case. 
Deciding when to retain the business appraiser can be a 
critical decision in the litigation process. Without adequate 
lead time, the appraiser may be limited in the time available for 
document review, industry research, and business analysis. As a 
consequence of inadequate lead time, weakness in the opinion may 
result in little weight being given by the court. 
This presentation discusses business valuation issues for 
divorce litigation and how they differ from traditional willing 
buyer perspectives of value. There are vast differences in the 
valuation purpose between a sale to a third party and an 
appraisal for equitable distribution. This presentation will 
highlight several of these substantive differences. 
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The purpose of this discussion is to illustrate many of the 
reasons why a divorce business appraisal may be different from an 
appraisal made for a willing buyer. It is incumbent on the 
advisor to identify specific State rules before making a business 
valuation for divorce. The nature of business valuation is 
difficult enough, requiring many assumptions, judgments, and 
speculations. To compound the problem with marital property 
rules, which differ throughout the country, makes a difficult task 
nearly impossible. But, with sound judgment, reasonableness, and 
a rational basis, a supportable business valuation can be made for 
divorce litigation purposes. 
BUSINESS VALUATION METHODS FOR DIVORCE 
VALUE THE BUSINESS TO THE MARITAL COMMUNITY 
The fundamental concept of divorce valuation is equitable 
distribution. The standard of value must reflect the purpose and 
function of the appraisal. The standard of value in divorce 
appraisal is what the business is worth to the marital community 
and not the price a buyer and seller would agree upon for a sale. 
This standard of value is important for a court to make an 
equitable distribution based on a realistic and relevant measure 
of value in relation to other marital property. 
The most important difference between a divorce valuation 
and the price the business would bring in a sale is the fact that 
there will be no sale. No willing buyer is negotiating a 
purchase price with a willing seller. While divorce valuation 
principles are similar to that of the willing buyer, the 
perspective of value is different. Under the willing buyer 
standard, value is determined from the perspective of any 
hypothetical investor. Under the divorce value standard, value 
is determined from the perspective of the present owner. 
Because value is measured in the hands of the present owner, 
adjustments properly made for a willing buyer may not apply, such 
as: a discount for the loss of "key personnel;" a discount for 
potential loss of business contacts; a discount for a change in 
management; a discount for lack of marketability; a discount for 
minority interest; a discount for restrictive covenants and buy-
sell agreements; a discount for capital gains taxes; a reduction 
for property, such as cash and cash equivalents, which would not 
be transferred in a sale; and a reduction for nonoperating and 
investment assets which would not be transferred in a sale. 
On the other hand, because marital property terminates 
upon divorce, certain discounts may be applicable in a divorce 
valuation which are not applicable to a third party investor. 
Future earnings, which form the basis of goodwill value, may 
contain a component of post-divorce effort which is not properly 
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considered marital property. For equitable distribution 
purposes a discount may be necessary to determine the marital 
goodwill value. In some states, personal goodwill is not marital 
property and must be deducted from the value of the business for 
equitable distribution valuation. 
While a lack of uniformity exists among the States in terms 
of defining divorce value, the most reasonable, rational, and 
relevant approach is to measure the investment value of the 
business to the current owner. For divorce purposes, this value 
is relevant to the marital community for equitable distribution 
and logic dictates it to be the appropriate standard of value. 
DIVORCE VALUATION INCLUDES BOTH PROPERTY AND PROFITS 
This discussion is directed toward small closely-held 
businesses being valued for divorce purposes. However, not all 
divorces involve small businesses. Some divorce cases may 
include very large closely-held businesses. In such cases, the 
business valuation methodology applied to large publicly-traded 
companies may properly be used in the divorce case. However, for 
purposes of this discussion, the nature of the business interest 
being appraised is considered to be small, with no active market 
for its stock, and it is owned by relatively few people. The 
primary premise is that one of the divorcing parties has control 
over the business being valued. 
For divorce purposes, such a business should be appraised by 
measuring value to the marital community of its component parts, 
including property and profits. 
To an investor, the value of a small closely-held business 
is found in both its property and its earning capacity. To the 
current owner, as to the investor, the value of the business is 
found in both its property and its earning capacity. Property 
can be sold for its value and earning capacity will generate 
income in the future. Consequently, both elements of value are 
important in divorce valuation. 
ELEMENTS OF VALUE 
A profitable operating business has three distinct 
components of value: 
(1) operating assets, 
(2) non-operating assets, and 
(3) intangible assets. 
For marital property valuation purposes, these three 
elements of value become especially important because the 
non-operating assets can be separated from the business without 
affecting operations while the operating assets cannot. Further, 
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